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The U. S. Army is undergoing a substantial departure from its historical 
underpinnings to adapt and succeed in the emerging arena of asymmetric 
warfare—i.e., migrating from a traditional ‘heavy’ approach to an agile and 
responsive capability.  Changes are not limited to equipment and doctrine, but are 
pervasive throughout all aspects of infrastructure and processes, including 
leadership.  Army Transformation is outlined by the Department of Defense 
(DoD) April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance and the subsequent 2004 
Army Transformation Roadmap.  One tenet of leadership transformation includes 
increased capability to develop and sustain innovation.  This paper analyzes 
civilian leadership competencies and capabilities related to the current Army 
training environment and identifies leadership competencies and capabilities 
deemed crucial for civilian leadership transformation.  A researchers-developed 
survey and interviews revealed noteworthy conclusions, including the following:  
(1) Civilian and military personnel share a common view of core leadership 
competencies required for transformative change; (2) Diversity of leadership 
experiences was widely regarded as a core leadership competency and is generally 
considered inadequate for civilian leadership; and (3) Cultural differences 
between civilian and military leaders are narrowing, but momentum must be 
nourished and encouraged to affect positive and permanent leadership 
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The Army Acquisition community can, perhaps, be maligned and 
criticized for being big, bureaucratic, and slow to respond.  The perception by 
some is that the Army civilian workforce is relatively uneducated and unfamiliar 
with effective leadership principles.  It became clear to this team during our 
Master’s research that documented differences between military and civilian 
leaders do exist, and that Army and executive civilian leaders alike contend that 
positive steps are needed to close that gap.  The team embraced the challenge of 
identifying the leadership competencies required of faithful stewards and 
advocates for transformative change mandated by the Department of Defense.  
Due to the enormity of the topic of leadership, analysis and conclusions are 
framed in terms of existing training programs.  Our findings support the assertion 
that leadership gaps exist between civilian and military leaders and that much 
commonality does exist among identified competencies for effective leadership.  
We briefly examined the role of the cultural differences between the two to 
evaluate their impact and noted that civilian attitudes towards leadership 
development must awaken and improve.  As the Army potentially migrates 
towards greater dependence on civilian leadership, the cultural shift becomes 
pivotal in the Army’s steadfast pursuit of acquisition excellence.  This cultural 
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As the Army progresses towards the Department of Defense (DoD) 
initiative explained in its April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, a 
substantially different acquisition environment is taking shape.  This 
revolutionary change, termed Transformation, applies to all four branches of the 
Armed Services.  In short, the Army is attempting to fundamentally change its 
business acquisition structure, processes, and results.  Army civilian leadership, in 
particular, is being challenged to adopt new competencies deemed necessary to 
support and sustain meaningful transformation.  This research identifies emerging 
leadership competencies derived from responses to a researchers-developed 
survey and semi-structured interviews conducted with five civilian, four retired 
military, and four active-duty military respondents.  Specifically, this study 
identifies civilian leadership training “gaps” and makes recommendations to 
assist leaders and managers to strengthen needed competencies. 
   
B. BACKGROUND 
A 2003 report evaluating Department of the Army (DA) leadership 
effectiveness (Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), 2003) 
identified significant differences between military and civilian leadership 
practices and competencies.  This report attributed those differences to the 
training environment and requirements of the two groups and pointed to a 
leadership training deficiency among Army civilians.   
In direct support of Army Transformation, Army civilians are increasingly 
assuming more leadership roles and responsibilities (Army Transformation 
Roadmap, 2004).  An underlying premise of the 2003 report was that for Army 




throughout the workforce, specific leadership competencies must be identified 
and taught systematically and pervasively.  Identification of the required core 
leadership competencies is an objective of this research paper. 
  
C. SCOPE OF PROJECT 
The United States Army is undergoing a substantial departure from its 
historical underpinnings to adapt, transform, and succeed in the emerging arena of 
asymmetric warfare, i.e., migrating from a traditional “heavy” approach to an 
agile and responsive capability.  Changes are not limited to new equipment and 
revised doctrine, but are pervasive throughout all aspects of infrastructure and 
processes, including a transformed military and civilian leadership.  Army 
Transformation is outlined by the Department of Defense (DoD) April 2003 
Transformation Planning Guidance and the subsequent 2004 Army 
Transformation Roadmap (ATR).  One tenet of leadership transformation 
includes increased capability to develop and sustain innovation.  This paper 
identifies leadership competencies and capabilities deemed crucial for Army 
Transformation.  Leadership competencies and capabilities in the current training 
environment were analyzed.  A researchers-developed survey and semi-structured 
interviews revealed noteworthy conclusions including the following:  (1) Civilian 
and military personnel, in general, share a common view of core leadership 
competencies required for transformative change; (2) Diversity of leadership 
experiences was widely regarded as a core leadership competency and is generally 
considered inadequate for civilian leadership; and (3) Cultural differences 
between civilian and military leaders are narrowing but must continue to do so in 
order to shape positive and permanent leadership improvements for Army 
civilians. 





This study used a three-tiered approach.  A five-person research team 
collectively developed an action plan to obtain necessary data and to aggregate 
individual findings and recommendations into a consolidated report.  The 
following paragraphs further detail the approach taken by the research team.   
Initially, a researchers-developed survey was used to obtain responses 
from approximately 4,200 respondents in the Army Acquisition Workforce 
(AAW), identifying perceptions of core leadership competencies needed to 
successfully accomplish mandated Army Transformation.  The survey data were 
complemented by responses to semi-structured interviews conducted with five 
civilian, four retired military, and four active-duty military leaders. 
Next, the current Army leadership development curriculum was evaluated 
and compared to perceived transformation competencies identified from the 
survey and interviews.  Potential gaps between the current training environment 
and perceived competencies of Army acquisition civilian leaders were identified. 
Finally, conclusions were drawn concerning the competencies needed by 
Army civilian leaders to understand, embrace, and transmit successful 
transformation, including recommendations to assist leaders and managers in 
training and education efforts.  The team also developed recommendations for 
further research. 
 
E. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study should assist Army leaders and managers to both understand 
possible needed competencies and to implement meaningful and impactful 
training and education programs.  Recommendations focus on closing identifiable 
gaps between the existing military and civilian leadership expectations and 





As civilian leadership roles in Army Acquisition continue to grow in 
number and responsibility, Army Transformation objectives will have a higher 


























II.  FRAMING THE STUDY 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Civilian leader development is a critical issue facing the Department of the 
Army as it deals with transformation, force restructuring and repositioning, 
outsourcing, changes in roles, missions, and other areas.  To ensure that the Army 
was effectively preparing to meet future needs, the Chief of Staff of the Army 
(CSA) directed an Army-wide study in 2002-2003.  
 The findings of the study were based on data obtained from more than 
40,000 Army civilians, soldiers, and senior leaders.  The study utilized four 
collection methods and capitalized on information from recent studies and relevant 
databases. 
 The first step in organizing the study was to convene a group of 20 
subject-matter experts (SMEs).  The next step was to develop a written survey for 
General Schedule (GS)-7 through GS-15 employees and supervisors, 
noncommissioned officers (Sergeant First Class (SFC) through Sergeant Major 
(SGM)), warrant officers, and field grade officers (MAJ – COL).  The 238-item 
survey was then mailed to more than 95,000 Army civilians and soldiers, more 
than a third of whom responded. 
The study also included 264 interviews with senior executive service 
members (SESs), general officers (GOs), garrison commanders, and other 
installation management personnel.  One hundred twenty-seven SESs and 76 GOs 
responded to the 86-item on-line survey. 
Study group members were organized into three study teams, one for each 
of the following areas:  
 
 •Army Culture  
 





 •Operational Training 
 
The study teams presented draft findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations to an executive panel, which then reviewed and discussed the 
teams’ findings.  The panel subsequently made suggestions for changes and 
forwarded those recommendations to the Strategic Conclusions and 
Recommendations Conference (SCRC).  The SCRC reviewed the draft 
conclusions and recommendations to ensure they were feasible and would be 
acceptable to the Army. 
The study clearly identified several areas needing attention.  Two critical 
problems were identified.  The first was that civilians within the Army were not 
being adequately prepared to assume leadership roles.  The second was the current 
civilian leader development system did not provide optimum opportunity for the 
Army to meet its transformation needs.  The bottom-line finding in the final 
report—Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Phase IV 
(Civilian), dated 24 February 2003—stated:  
The Army Vision emphasizes People, Readiness, and Transformation—in 
that order.  No amount of money or cutting-edge technology will achieve 
readiness or transformation without people, the Army's centerpiece.  The 
leadership of those people is the key to fulfilling the Army Vision.  The 
Army grows and develops the best soldiers in the world—and trains them 
to be leaders.  However, growing Army civilian leaders has fallen short of 
that requirement [emphasis added].  
The study recommended four main imperatives to maximize Army civilian 
contributions to the Army and twelve general recommendations under the four 
imperatives.  Forty specific recommendations coming from the twelve general 
recommendations were also tied to the four main imperatives.  These 
recommendations were developed to provide direction for improving the systems 
and processes for developing civilians and growing leaders.  The four imperatives 













 There have been numerous studies over the past ten to 15 years aimed at 
improving management and leadership in the Federal Government.  Many of the 
findings in these studies underscore the common themes found in the ATLDP 
study, including the following: 
 •There is no integrated, systemic approach for Army civilian leader 
development. 
  
 •Army civilians are not aware of leader development and training 
opportunities. 
  
 •Army civilians are frustrated by lack of opportunities to advance. 
 
 •Supervisors are more effective in technical and conceptual skills than in 
interpersonal skills.  
  
 •The Army is not developing civilian leaders for the future. 
 
 It is evident from these previous studies that the Army has been aware of 
its shortfalls in developing Army civilian leaders but, for whatever reason, has not 
followed through on the ATLDP recommendations.  The Army has not made the 
necessary changes to effectively prepare civilian leaders to engage the challenges 
associated with Army Transformation—i.e., it has made insufficient efforts to 
institute accountability to meet identified mandates in the area of leadership 





extending vertically up the chain of command.  The following findings resulted 
from respondent data concerning accountability: 
•70% of senior leaders report that Army civilian leader development 
programs have a low priority in relation to other tasks.  
 
•64% of supervisors and 52% of SESs say their organizations have less 
funding for training Army civilians than they need. 
 
•33% of senior leaders believe that current leader development programs 
are ineffective.  
 
•More than 33% of all respondents say lack of resources (e.g., time, 
money) and excessive workload interferes with receiving leader 
development training. 
  
•The majority of SESs and GOs believe that low priority of leader 
development, employee workload and unwillingness to relocate detracts 
from the development of effective Army civilian leaders. 
 
•Only 12% of Army civilians are eligible for the civilian core leadership 
courses, and this audience is not attending them. 
 
•51% of civilian supervisors say that their organization has less access to 
training courses or programs than it needs.  
 
•Less than 50% of Army civilian supervisors say that supervisors, 
coworkers, career program/field guidelines, Army Civilian Training, 
Education, and Development System plans, and Civilian Personnel 
Advisory Center personnel specialists are effective in letting them know 
how to develop as an Army civilian leader. 
  
•About 25% of SESs/GOs report that supervisors/managers resist 
supporting leader development and that the right Army civilians are not 
identified for the right training. 
  
•45% of SESs/GOs report "nothing" or "not much" or did not respond to 
the question asking, "What is being done in your organization to overcome 
barriers to leader development?"  Focus-group responses indicated lack of 







•Less than 50% of the Army civilians believe that performance counseling 
helps them know their strengths and weaknesses on the job.  
 
 The study group relating to accountability provided two recommendations: 
•Make Army civilian training, education and leadership development a 
high priority.  
 
•Ensure that the Army civilian performance evaluation system provides 
effective performance accountability and feedback and provides for 
professional development. 
 
C. LIFELONG LEARNING 
Learning can be considered the underlying premise for and critical 
contributor to all leadership development.  Because leaders exist and function 
within an organizational context, organizations would, thus, be responsible for 
motivating employees to make learning a lifelong pursuit.  Obviously the two 
axioms are somewhat inseparable: organizations learn to the extent that individual 
employees learn.  One without the other forebodes failure to reach full potential.  
Similarly, lifelong learning would need top-down support and direct linkage to an 
organization's strategic plans and goals.  Careful planning and continual 
development of increasingly challenging work assignments and work design 
become ingredients for balancing training, education and development, 
operational assignments, self-development, and mentoring.  The following 
findings resulted from respondent data concerning lifelong learning:  
•The majority of respondents want a leader development system similar to 
the system that exists for soldiers. 
 
•The field would like to see more Army civilians provided with leader 
development training earlier in their careers. 
 
•Many respondents indicate they have little or no help in finding training 







•The majority of respondents would like more training to be available at 
their own installations, on-line, and by correspondence because they are 
often not allowed to travel to attend training. 
  
•Respondents would like a variety of assignments to gain on-the-job 
training and assignments aligned with training so that the learning can be 
reinforced. 
  
•Nearly 50% of senior leaders believe that insufficient opportunities exist 
for Army civilian leader development and that Army civilians in their 
organizations are not being adequately developed to "lead change." 
 
•Senior leaders also believe that the priority given existing leader 
development programs is too low compared to other initiatives and that the 
absence of a centralized approach to leader development is an obstacle to 
adequate leader development training for Army civilians. 
  
•About 50% of the senior leaders said "nothing” or "not much" is being done 
in their organizations to overcome barriers to effective leader 
development. 
 
•Many Army civilians requested a document that shows specific steps, 
such as a checklist or road map and tying training to career progression.  
 
The following recommendations were made concerning lifelong learning: 
•Create a training and development paradigm that incorporates a lifelong 
learning philosophy. 
 
•Replace the current civilian career programs and career fields with a broad 
career management system for all Army civilians in support of readiness. 
 
•Implement a developmental continuum for Army civilians. 
 
•Promote self-development as part of the Army lifelong learning philosophy. 
 
•Publish and make accessible guidelines. 
 
•Develop a centralized Army education system, integrating civilian and military 





D. INTERPERSONAL SKILLS 
Regardless of the ability to spot organizational problems or to articulate a 
long-term vision for achieving organizational success, ultimately, a leader’s 
ability to persuade employees to adapt to needed changes becomes paramount.  
Interpersonal skills are critical for generating and sustaining momentum to 
accomplish change and for maintaining organization-wide focus on organizational 
goals and objectives.  Leaders’ understanding of human capital and utilization of 
their interpersonal skills directly impact organizational climate for better or for 
worse, and organizational climate appears to affect productivity.  The logic for 
investing in and developing civilian leaders skilled in interpersonal behavior 
becomes obvious—i.e., motivating and inspiring others, obtaining support and 
commitment from subordinates and stakeholders, developing team effectiveness, 
and aligning structural variables (technology and rewards) to ensure positive 
climates conducive to high productivity. 
Research has shown that the way people feel about their organization can 
account for 20–30% of the organization's performance.  Furthermore, 
organizational leaders account for 50–70% of how employees perceive their 
organization's climate (Goleman, 2002).  Clearly, the use—and, unfortunately, 
misuse—of interpersonal skills directly impacts organizational performance.  
The following findings resulted from respondent data concerning interpersonal 
skills: 
•Army civilians, SESs, and GOs view interpersonal skills as the most 
important leadership dimension for today's and tomorrow's leaders.  
 
•Army civilian leaders are seen as more competent in their technical 
specialities than in their interpersonal skills. 
 
•The most frequently mentioned interpersonal skill is communication. 
Communication skills include: active listening, writing, and public 
speaking/briefing.  Communication skills also include interacting and 






•Understanding people is the second most frequently mentioned 
interpersonal skill.  This refers to understanding and interacting with a  
 
diverse workforce, including acceptance of different personalities and work 
styles, as well as understanding different perspectives. 
 
•The third most frequently mentioned interpersonal skill is team building. 
 
•Some respondents mentioned that the Army should evaluate leadership 
potential before hiring people for supervisory positions.  
 
•Focus groups indicate that Army civilians want more leadership courses in 
general.  
 
•Many respondents complained about the quality of their own supervisors 
and about their own lack of supervisory skills.  They would like leader 
development courses to be open to all levels. 
 
•Thirty percent of all Army employees are not satisfied with the degree of 
open communication between civilian supervisors and civilian subordinates. 
 
The study group provided the following recommendation with respect to 
interpersonal skills: 
•Make interpersonal skills development a priority by taking the following 
steps/actions: 
 1. Make interpersonal skills a dimension of performance evaluation 
for people on the leadership track. 
 
 2. Make interpersonal skills a selection criterion for leadership 
positions.  
 
 3. The Army must provide interpersonal skills training at all levels of 
leader and employee development. 
 
E. ARMY CULTURE 
According to Field Manual (FM) 22-100 Army Leadership, culture is "a 
group's shared s e t  o f  beliefs, values, and assumptions about what's important."  




assumptions, beliefs, and values and is expressed through "what is done, how it is 
done, and who is doing it" (Farmer, 1990).  Because culture runs deep and is slow 
to change, many employess can take culture for granted, not fully appreciating its 
substantial impact throughout the organization—i.e., on decision-making, 
communications, perceptions, levels of output, and intended outcomes.  
Therefore, understanding why (sub)cultures behave the way they do becomes 
essential for understanding the forces driving those behaviors.  According to 
Farmer, "failure to understand the way in which an organization's culture will 
interact with various contemplated change strategies thus may mean the failure of 
the strategies themselves" (Farmer, 1990).  Case studies of corporations 
undergoing change (Wilms, 1996; Zell, 1997) and institutions engaging in 
transformation efforts (Kezar & Eckel, 2000) reveal that organizational culture 
can either facilitate or inhibit institutional transformation, depending on the fit 
between the existing culture and the proposed change.  The following findings 
resulted from respondent data concerning Army culture: 
•Army civilians are committed to making a career with the Army. 
 
•Most Army civilians (97–99%) plan to stay with the Army until they are at 
least retirement-eligible.  
 
•A sizeable majority (70-80%) of respondents also believe that their 
coworkers intend to make a career with the Army.  
 
•A sizeable majority (61–78%) of respondents perceive their coworkers to 
be satisfied working for the Army.  A sizeable majority (71–84%) would 
recommend the Army as a good employer. 
 
•A sizeable to vast majority (68-86%) perceive that their coworkers are 
willing to put in extra hours and extra effort to complete work assignments if 
needed to do so. 
 
•A sizeable majority (65–76%) of Army civilians agree that "pride in the 
Army" and "desire to serve their country" are important factors influencing 






•SESs and GOs agree with Army civilians about the level of importance of 
work and pride in influencing them to continue to work for the Army, but 
senior leadership underestimates the level of importance to Army civilians  
of pay, benefits, job security, promotion opportunities, and training and 
education. 
 
•A vast majority (70—88%) of Army civilians perceive that their coworkers 
demonstrate Army values in their work.  A majority to vast majority (51—
61% of employees and 67%—80% of supervisors) perceive that their Army 
civilian leaders practice Army values. 
 
The following recommendations were made concerning Army culture: 
•Integrate and strengthen relationships among Officers, Warrant Officers, 
Noncommissioned Officers, and Army civilians within the Army. 
  
•The Army must increase its commitment to Army civilians. 
 
•Adopt and incorporate into doctrine the following: 
"The Army Civilian Corps is an experienced professional cadre committed 
to serve the nation." and "The Army Civilian Corps provides mission-
essential capability, stability, and continuity during war and peace in 
support of the soldier." 
 
F. SUMMARY 
The Army Civilian Study of 2002-2003 was the largest self-assessment 
ever done by the Army.  Completed in January 2003, the study confirms the 
Army’s plan to train soldiers and civilians and to grow them into leaders through 
training and leader development programs.  However, it further states the Army 
has fallen short with respect to growing its civilian leaders.  The study points out 
that the Army’s policies are out of balance with the expectations of Army 
civilians.  The study also brings to light that the Army has failed to provide 
leadership training opportunities to its civilians and that the future environment in 





 The study culminates with the following recommendations and 
imperatives surrounding: 
Accountability – The Army must make developing civilians a high 
priority; tie personal, professional, and job performance together; 
accomplish the study’s recommendations; and evaluate effectiveness. 
 
Lifelong Learning – The Army should revamp career management with 
“gates” for progression and build an effective Civilian Education System 
(CES). 
   
Interpersonal Skills – The Army must recognize that they are pivotal to 
leader competence, teach them, and select leaders that exhibit them. 
   
Army Culture – Currently, there are two cultures: Uniform and Civilian.  
The Army must integrate them into one. 
 
The study emphasized the following five recommendations:   
1.  Make Army Civilian training, education and leader development a 
priority. 
 
2.  Integrate civilian and military individual training, education, and 
development where possible. 
 
3.  Improve the relationship among all members of the force. 
 
4.  Create a training and development program that incorporates lifelong 
learning. 
 
5.  Make interpersonal skills development a priority. 
 
The Panel’s final recommendations to the Army Chief of Staff were to 
take the following immediate actions: 
•Publish a CSA statement about the importance of the interdependent 
relationships among the cohorts that compose the Army Team. 
 
•Establish the Army Civilian Corps by redesignating Department of the 
Army civilians as members of the Army Civilian Corps. 
 





•Adopt the new Army Civilian Creed. 
 
•Implement combined SES/GO orientation training. 
 
•Implement a Strategic Communications Campaign Plan for Army 
Civilians. 
 
•Establish a Civilian Advisory Board. 
 
•Publish an Army Civilian Handbook. 
 
•Commit to the protection of resources for civilian leadership 
development. 
 
•Improve the relationship among the Army components. 
 
•Integrate civilian and military individual training, education, and 
development where appropriate. 
 
•Create a training and development system that incorporates lifelong 








To understand what leadership means to today’s Army, it is important to 
establish a baseline of how the institutional Army views leadership and how 
conventional management theory supports different leadership models referenced 
by the Army.  Both views of leadership are integral to establishing a framework 
and theoretical background for this study. 
 
B. INSTITUTIONAL ARMY LEADERSHIP 
The Army field manual on leadership, FM 22-100 Army Leadership, 
represents the Army’s doctrinal position on leadership for both military and 
civilian personnel.  While FM 22-100 covers a wide berth of leadership areas—
including practical performance evaluation techniques with examples—this 
section will focus more on the leadership theory, framework, and concepts 
outlined in the manual.  It should be noted that the current version of FM 22-100, 
dated August 1999, addresses leaders at all levels, including civilians.  The 
previous version focused on leadership at the battalion level and below and 
targeted military only.  Additionally, the current FM 22-100 has been expanded to 
supersede four other publications: FM 22-101 (Leadership Counseling); FM 22-
102 (Soldier Team Development); FM 22-103 (Leadership and Command at 
Senior Levels); and DA Pamphlet 600-80 (Executive Leadership).  The manual 
defines leadership as follows: 
Leadership is influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and 








C. THE ARMY LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1 below depicts the Army’s framework for addressing leadership.  
The basic premise is that the Army leader must “Be,” “Know,” and “Do” to be a 
successful leader.  The top of the figure indicates four areas that the military or 












Within these four main categories, there are specific and general 
dimensions of Army leadership.  In some cases, they are relatively specific, such 
as integrity.  In others, they are represented by broader subcategories such as 
mental, physical, and emotional.  It is important to note that these same values, 
attributes, skills, and characteristics represent the structural basis for many of the 
leadership knowledges examined and analyzed within this research paper. 
1. “Be” a Leader 
This element of “Be, Know, Do” is described as the leader’s character.  
The Army is a “values-based” institution that heavily emphasizes the individual 




leader’s need to set high standards, lead by example, do what is legally and 
morally right, and influence others to do the same.  The Army leader must not 
only understand Army values and develop appropriate attributes, but also practice 
them daily.   
2. “Know” the Right Things 
The “Know” element indicates that a leader must possess certain skills and 
knowledge to be a competent leader.  As shown in the framework and in Figure 2, 
this element is subdivided across four domains: interpersonal skills, conceptual 









3. “Do” the Right Things 
The “Do” element represents the actions taken by leaders.  Leader actions 
are divided into three categories: influencing, operating, and improving.  These 





Figure 2:  Four Domains of “Knowing” 
 Interpersonal Skills - knowledge of your people and how to 
work with them.
 Conceptual Skills - the ability to understand and apply the 
doctrine and other ideas required to do your job.
 Technical Skills – how to use your equipment.
 Tactical Skills – the ability to make the right decisions 














D. LEADERSHIP LEVELS 
Another model used by the Army illustrates the different levels of 
leadership subdivided into three distinct types.  Figure 4 graphically depicts the 











Figure 3:  Three Categories of “Doing” 
Figure 4:  The Three Leadership Levels 
 Influencing – making decisions, communicating those 
decisions, and motivating people.
 Operating - the things you do to accomplish your 
organization’s immediate mission.
 Improving – the things you do to increase your 





1. Direct Leadership 
This level of leadership is basically first-line leadership where there is 
direct interaction between the leader and subordinates on a fairly frequent basis.  
The interaction is usually at least weekly and can be daily.  The key element of 
direct leadership is direct contact and interaction between the leader and 
subordinate personnel. 
2. Organizational Leadership 
Organizational leadership is characterized by a larger span of control, 
where leaders influence several hundred to several thousand people.  The leader 
accomplishes the control through several levels of subordinates and usually will 
have a staff to help lead and manage resources under his/her area of responsibility.  
The organizational leader must possess many of the skills of a direct leader, 
though the degree is different.  There is more emphasis on influencing, through 
policymaking and systems integration, than in direct face-to-face management 
with subordinates.  Organizational leaders at this level typically are military 
leaders at the brigade through corps levels, military and DA civilian leaders at 
directorate through installation levels, and DA civilians at the assistant through 
undersecretary of the Army levels.  Their focus is generally on planning and 
mission spanning two to ten years in the future. 
3. Strategic Leadership 
Strategic leaders are involved in the internal and external environments 
within which the Army operates.  These leaders include both military and civilian 
members at the major command (FORSCOM, TRADOC, AMC, etc.) through 
Department of Defense levels.  Span of control ranges from several thousand 
personnel to hundreds of thousands of personnel.  Strategic leaders address 
complex problems and are responsible for high-level functions, including: 
establishing force structure; allocating resources; communicating strategic vision; 




environment, there is increasing emphasis on interoperability and joint operations 
at the strategic level.  The strategic leader is often concerned with Congressional 
hearings, service wide constraints, weapon system acquisition, research and 
development, and interservice cooperation. 
 
E. ARMY LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
1. Institutional Training 
The Army school system is modeled on a progressive learning model 
similar to that of public education.  The primary difference is that the Army 
expects personnel to use their skills in an assignment before being considered for 
the next level of schooling.  This institutional training is a critical component in 
developing and preparing leaders for increased responsibility.  The Army model 
for leadership development is built on many of the tenets included in the 
leadership framework, plus a three-tiered training model that consists of 










                                           




2. Operational Assignments 
Progressive operational assignments represent a major leg of the 
leadership development for both civilian and military personnel.  Operational 
assignments are considered by many as on-the-job-training.  These opportunities 
allow leaders to broaden the knowledge and refine the skills learned from 
institutional training and previous assignments.  Progressive operational 




The third leg of the leader development model is self-development.  The 
self-development process is designed to enhance the leader’s previously acquired 
skills, knowledge, and experience by focusing on areas that need improvement.  
Self-development is continuous and involves two-way interaction between the 
leader and his/her first-line supervisor. 
 
F. CONVENTIONAL MANAGEMENT THEORY 
Conventional business theory on leadership changes or evolves over time.  
For example, there was a time when any discussion on managerial techniques 
involved reference to Dr. Ken Blanchard’s and Dr. Spencer Johnson’s The One 
Minute Manager or Stephen Covey’s Seven Habits of Highly Effective People. 
Though not as widely publicized, today’s discussion of leadership might include 
reference to James Kouze’s and Barry Posner’s The Leadership Challenge or 
Daniel Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence (Topping, 2002).  To examine whether 
Army leadership theory is contemporary, this section will detail some of the 
attributes of the leadership models laid out by Kouze, Posner, and Goleman and 
will provide a summary comparison.  Additionally, it will discuss key 




Prior to Knowledge Wave 2003-The Leadership Forum (February 2003), 
McKinsey and Company produced a background paper as a primer and discussion 
document that summarizes the evolution of leadership research and theory over 
time.  Figure 6 illustrates that, when looking back over the evolution of leadership 
thinking, one sees a succession of theories of what makes effective leadership, as 
well as a wide range of proposed leadership “styles” that describe how leaders 
operate (McKinsey & Company, 2003).     
It is evident that the early research focused on the individual leader, and 
eventually the scope expanded to encompass the organization as a whole.  The 
1990s further expanded the scope of what comprises effective leadership with the 
idea of “network” leadership thinking.  According to McKinsey & Company, 
network leadership argues that one leader alone is never enough—and that truly 
effective leaders aim to build a community of leaders and change-makers within 
the ranks of their organization, supporting them through knowledge management 
systems and appropriate development programs.  It is interesting to note the 
leadership style for the “network school” period is described as “front-
line/lieutenant and knowledge leadership.”  The use of a military term to describe 
the network school will be discussed in more detail in the following summary 
comparison section, but certainly an immediate link between network-focused 
































In The Leadership Challenge, Kouze and Posner describe their leadership 
model, which they based on data collected from thousands of successful and 
effective managers in order to determine what practices and behaviors they had in 
common.  They used a “personal best” method to key in on the common threads 
within the stories recounted when managers were asked to think of a peak 
leadership experience.  Kouze and Posner identified the following five 
competencies based on their findings: 
 




•Model the Way 
 
•Inspire a Shared Vision 
 
•Challenge the Process 
 
•Enable Others to Act  
 
•Encourage the Heart  
 
 
The study found that the top leaders exhibited certain attributes and 
characteristics associated with those five competencies listed above (Wiley, 
2006).  They are: 
1.         Model the Way 
 
•Leaders establish principles concerning the way people 
(constituents, peers, colleagues, and customers alike) should be 
treated and the way goals should be pursued. 
•They create standards of excellence and then set an example for 
others to follow. 
•They set interim goals so that people can achieve small wins as 
they work toward larger objectives. 
•They unravel bureaucracy when it impedes action; they put up 
signposts when people are unsure of where to go or how to get 
there; and they create opportunities for victory.   
 
2.         Inspire a Shared Vision 
 
•Leaders passionately believe that they can make a difference. 
•They envision the future, creating an ideal and unique image of 
what the organization can become. 
•Through their magnetism and quiet persuasion, leaders enlist 
others in their dreams. 
•They breathe life into their visions and get people to see exciting 
possibilities for the future. 
 
3.         Challenge the Process 
 





•They look for innovative ways to improve the organization and, in 
doing so, they experiment and take risks. 
•Because leaders know that risk taking involves mistakes and 
failures, they accept the inevitable disappointments as learning 
opportunities. 
 
4.         Enable Others to Act 
 
•Leaders foster collaboration and build spirited teams. 
•They actively involve others. 
•Leaders understand that mutual respect is what sustains 
extraordinary efforts; they strive to create an atmosphere of trust 
and human dignity. 
•They strengthen others, making each person feel capable and 
powerful. 
 
5.         Encourage the Heart 
 
•Accomplishing extraordinary things in organizations is hard work. 
•To keep hope and determination alive, leaders recognize 
contributions that individuals make. 
•In every winning team, the members need to share in the rewards 
of their efforts, so leaders celebrate accomplishments. 
•They make people feel like heroes. 
 
 
Kouze and Posner also developed a 360° feedback instrument called “The 
Leadership Practices Inventory (LPI).”  The instrument is designed to assess an 
individual’s effectiveness as perceived by his peers, subordinates, and supervisors.  
Specifically, the tool assesses the extent to which leaders actually use the five 
practices so that they can make plans for improvement.  
Daniel Goleman’s leadership model was first presented in his book 
Emotional Intelligence.  He argues that human such as self-awareness, self-
discipline, persistence, and empathy are of greater consequence than intelligence 
quotients (IQ) in much of life (Emotional Intelligence Consortium, 2004).  These 
factors are defined as “emotional intelligence” and are described below in the five 





1.         Self-Awareness 
•Emotional Awareness - Recognizing one’s emotions and their 
effects 
•Accurate Self-Assessment - Knowing one’s strengths and limits 
•Self-Confidence - Sureness about one’s self-worth and capabilities  
 
2.         Self-Regulation 
•Self-control - Managing disruptive emotions and impulses 
•Trustworthiness - Maintaining standards of honesty and integrity 
•Conscientiousness - Taking responsibility for personal 
performance 
•Adaptability - Flexibility in handling change 
•Innovativeness - Being comfortable with and open to novel ideas 
and new information 
 
3.         Self-Motivation 
•Achievement drive - Striving to improve or meet a standard of 
excellence 
•Commitment - Aligning with the goals of the group or 
organization 
•Initiative - Readiness to act on opportunities 
•Optimism - Persistence in pursuing goals despite obstacles and 
setbacks 
 
4.         Social Awareness 
•Empathy - Sensing others’ feelings and perspective, and taking an 
active interest in their concerns 
•Service orientation - Anticipating, recognizing, and meeting 
customers’ needs 
•Developing others - Sensing what others need in order to develop 
and bolstering their abilities 
•Leveraging diversity - Cultivating opportunities through diverse 
people 
•Political awareness - Reading a group’s emotional currents and 
power relationships 
 
5.         Social Skills 
•Influence - Wielding effective tactics for persuasion 




•Leadership - Inspiring and guiding groups and people  
•Change catalyst - Initiating or managing change 
•Conflict management - Negotiating and resolving disagreements 
•Building bonds - Nurturing instrumental relationships 
•Collaboration and cooperation - Working with others toward 
shared goals 
•Team capabilities - Creating group synergy in pursuing collective 
goals  
 
Perhaps the message is that one does not have to be the smartest to be an 
effective leader.  Rather, emotional maturity and credibility play more important 
roles in how well one provides leadership inside an organization (Topping, 2002).  
The key point is that there are many competencies other than pure intelligence or 
technical know-how that determine whether or not a leader is successful and 
effective. 
Peter Topping points out in his book Managerial Leadership that 
competencies should have an orientation toward the future—i.e., what skills do 
our managers need to demonstrate five years from now to make our company 
successful, since it will take time to develop those competencies? (Topping, 2002)  
Topping and his colleague, Professor David Schweiger, were hired by the Robert 
Bosch Corporation (US) in 1995 to help the company develop the managerial 
competencies that would be required of its middle managers 20 years out.  One of 
the key lessons they learned during this project was that involvement of the 
employees in developing the competencies was instrumental to the success of the 
project.  They also concluded that in order for a manager to be an effective leader, 
he must be skilled in the three components of developing people: coaching, 
teaching, and mentoring.  As a coach, a manager zeros in on results and 
developing associates’ performance capabilities.  As a teacher, he/she 
concentrates on helping people to learn and apply new their knowledge or skills.  
And, as a mentor, a manager focuses on their longer-term career and personal 
development (Topping, 2002).  Additionally, Topping and Schweiger concluded 




both educational activities and on-the-job experiences.  Topping suggests that 
education, by itself, lacks the learning that would be gained from application, and 
on-the-job experiences lack the focus of intensive education and are too slow 
without the turbo boosts from educational programs (Topping, 2002). 
The matrix for on-the-job experiences, shown in Figure 7, illustrates how 
each competency can be methodically planned out with a structured development 
strategy.  One final and important lesson was that the identification of a solid list 
of competencies does not accomplish anything if managers in the organization fail 
to use them as guides for development (Topping, 2002). 
 
G. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This section compares the Army Leadership Framework to the referenced 
conventional management theory as previously outlined.  The intent is not to 
determine whether or not the Army Leadership Framework is correct, but to make 
the case that the Army Leadership Framework is contemporary in its basic tenets 
and construct.  Additionally, an examination of the work (particularly lessons 
learned) that Peter Topping completed at the Robert Bosch Corporation (US) in 
1995 will be applied toward the competencies and follow-up efforts resulting 






Figure 7:  On-The-Job Experience Matrix 
 
 
According to McKinsey and Company’s historical leadership evolution 
chart (Figure 6), the U.S. Army is currently in the network-school period.  This 
period is described as focusing on how leadership occurs across members of a 
network and how leadership is enacted as a distributed responsibility.  The 
leadership style for this period is described as front-line or lieutenant leadership 
along with knowledge leadership.  Obviously, the U.S. Army, with its military and 
civilian structure, meets all the requirements of a complex network.  The Army’s 
leadership levels address how leadership is enacted as a distributed responsibility 
and, certainly, the military organizational structure of platoons, companies, 




leadership style of front-line or lieutenant is prevalent throughout the military 
hierarchy is debatable and is, most likely, a stretch.  Nonetheless, the Army 
Leadership Framework supports the current network-school period and the 
relevance of network leadership theory. 
The leadership challenge model is easily correlated to the Army 
Leadership Framework, and these are displayed graphically in Figure 8.  
“Modeling the way” is fundamentally about leadership values;  “inspiring a shared 
vision” relates to motivating while communicating the common vision;  
“challenging the process” means assessing the situation and modifying the status 
quo or the current plan, otherwise known as adaptability; “enabling others to act” 
is empowering others by giving them the respect they deserve; and, finally, 
“encouraging the heart” involves the interpersonal aspect of leadership to reward 
and take care of the team.  The conclusion in this case is straightforward in that 
the leadership challenge model and the Army Leadership Framework are based on 













Figure 8:  Leadership Model Comparison 
•Model the Way
•Inspire a Shared Vision
•Challenge the Process






The key point made with the emotional intelligence model is that many 
competencies other than pure intelligence or technical know-how determine 
whether a leader is successful or effective.  The Army Leadership Framework 
supports the emotional intelligence leadership model in that it emphasizes so 
many elements other than the leader’s mental attributes and the technical skills.  It 
is apparent that self-awareness relates to the self-development principles of the 
Army leadership development model and that self-regulation addresses the Army 
leader’s values and emotional attributes.  Self-motivation can be aligned with duty 
and selfless service.  Both social awareness and social skills involve interpersonal 
skills and influencing others.  This understanding of the emotional intelligence 
leadership model makes it clear that the Army Leadership Framework, combined 
with the Army leadership development model, supports the notion that it takes 
much more than IQ to make a good leader. 
The primary purpose of including a discussion of conventional business 
theory is to form a structured basis for important lessons learned from this study.  
Some key lessons learned and points to consider resulted from Peter Topping’s 















Figure 9:  Key Competency Lessons Learned 
 Involve the organization in the competency refinement effort.
 Develop competencies that are forward looking.
 Ensure the competencies are used to build leadership development.
 Develop an educational and experience based leadership development plan.
 Emphasize coaching, teaching, and mentoring as necessary leadership skills. 




The previous discussion, as well as the comparison of a few select 
conventional business leadership models with the Army Leadership Framework, 
indicates that the Army framework is contemporary in its basic design.  The 
similar elements and concepts are best explained in the preface of FM 22-100 by 
the statement, “The Army Leadership Framework brings together many existing 
leadership concepts by establishing leadership dimensions and showing how they 
relate to each other.”  It is obvious that much effort was devoted to making the 
revised FM 22-100 a single-source reference for all Army leaders with the stated 
purpose of: 
 
1.  Providing leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements under 
all conditions. 
 
2.  Establishing a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders:  military 
and civilian, active and reserve, officer and enlisted. 
 
3.  Providing a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the 

















The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA (ALT)), Military Deputy (MILDEP) tasked the Acquisition 
Support Center (ASC) to lead Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) transformation 
(ASC, 12 February 2006).  One of the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap 
(ATR) initiatives being addressed by the ASC is the development of innovative 
and adaptive leaders who are comfortable operating as part of the Joint Force 
(U.S. ATR Summary, 2004).  The research team, with the goal of maximizing 
feedback and reviewable data, reached a cooperative agreement with the ASC to 
disseminate the survey questionnaire to the entire Army Acquisition Workforce 
(AAW).  In return, the research team will provide ASC with the survey results and 
the team’s findings. 
To ensure ease of use and timeliness, the team opted to conduct a web-
based survey.  The questionnaire was developed over a period of two months and 
beta-tested prior to notification.  The ASC then communicated the survey website 
to the entire AAW via electronic mail notifications, along with the corresponding 
request to complete the survey.  The link to the survey website was held active for 
two weeks.  When the window did close, slightly fewer than 4,200 respondents, 
representing approximately nine percent of the AAW, provided input that became 
the baseline data for review.  The screen shots of this survey and tables of the 
aggredated data are provided in Appendix A. 
The survey was not designed to accept detailed opinions and lengthy 
responses, focusing instead on the identification of key core competencies needed 
by Army leaders in support of transformation objectives.  To supplement the raw 
data and gain the objective feedback relevant for the team’s research, a number of 





conducted with military and civilian leaders, both active and retired.  The survey 
results and semi-structured interview findings are provided later in this report.      
 
B. QUESTIONS 
A primary goal of the research team was to gather as much relevant data as 
possible from which to conduct analysis.  The external data collection efforts 
consisted of a researchers-developed, web-based survey and 13 semi-structured 
personal interviews.  The following details the team’s approach. 
1. Web-Based Survey 
The web-based survey was the preferred tool for implementation and was 
developed with time constraints and simplicity in mind.  The research team 
conducted brainstorming sessions, literary research, and reviews of leadership 
programs to establish a wide assortment of leadership competencies.  Special 
attention was given to ensure that the competencies selected for inclusion were 
leadership-related rather than managerial in nature.  The team reviewed these 
competencies for redundancy and consolidated them where appropriate.  The core 
leadership competencies included in the survey are found in Table 1. 
 
2. Semi-Structured Personal Interview Questions 
The semi-structured personal interviews were conducted with military and 
civilian leaders, both active-duty and retired.  The interview questions, which 
were provided prior to the interviews, were intended to not only be specifically 
addressed, but also to serve as points of departure to gain additional insights and 
perspectives regarding leadership challenges in support of Army Transformation. 
The research team established the premise for the interviewees by pointing 
out that previous studies have identified substantial differences between civilian 




our research team was to identify the leadership competencies that Army civilians 
need in order to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the 
Acquisition workforce.  The personal interview questions were: 
 
1.  Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between 
Army civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why?  
(Follow on as appropriate) 
 
2.  What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what 
additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to 
accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation?  i.e., which leadership 
competencies (civilian and military) are most needed and why? 
 
3.  What is your perception of the state of the current training and 
education system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to 
prepare them to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system? 
 
4.  Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among 
civilians and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed 
most important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation.  
Do you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education 


















ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
BEING A COACH AND A MENTOR 
BOTTOM LINE COMMUNICATION 
BRIEFING SENIOR LEVEL PERSONNEL 
BUILDING CONSENSUS 
DEVELOPING A SENSE OF URGENCY IN OTHERS 
DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING A POSITIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
DIRECTION/GOAL SETTING 
EFFECTS OF HUMOR IN THE WORKPLACE 
EMPLOYEE DEVELOPMENT 
EMPOWERMENT IMPORTANCE AND TECHNIQUES 
IMPLEMENTING CHANGE 
IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE LISTENING 









UNDERSTANDING LEADERSHIP STYLE DIFFERENCES 
UNDERSTANDING MOTIVATIONAL THEORY 
UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 
UNDERSTANDING THE ART OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
UNDERSTANDING THE POWER OF HIGH EXPECTATIONS 
 




V.  SURVEY RESULTS 
 
This portion of the study analyzes the findings of the Army Acquisition 
Workforce (AAW) survey questionnaire.  As previously noted, there are 
fundamental differences between the military and civilian training opportunities 
relating to leadership of soldiers and civilians.  This study provides analysis and 
recommendations for Army leadership to establish skill sets for civilian leadership 
and then to provide opportunities to both military and civilian leaders to improve 
these capabilities. 
Table 2 and Figure 10 represent the civilian workforce responses, 
subdivided into categories by rank, along with the percentage of the total civilian 
workforce responses.  As noted, the majority of the responses are from GS-12s 




Number Civilian Rank Percentage of Total 
20 SES 0.53% 
872 GS-12 23.28% 
1302 GS-13 34.76% 
575 GS-14 15.35% 
417 GS-15 11.13% 
560 Other 14.95% 
3746     
 
















Figure 10:  Civilian Rank 
 
Table 3 and Figure 11 represent the active military workforce responses 
subdivided into categories by rank, along with the percentage of total active 
military workforce responses.  As noted, the majority of responses are from O-4 
(Major), with approximately 40% responding, and O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel), with 
approximately 28% responding. 
 
 
Number Active Military Percentage of Total 
79 0-3 18.29% 
172 0-4 39.81% 
119 0-5 27.55% 
42 0-6 9.72% 
1 0-9 0.23% 
17 Enlisted 3.94% 
1 W-3 0.23% 
1 W-4 0.23% 
432     
 


























Table 4 represents the civilian workforce respondents’ certification levels.  
The preponderance of the civilian workforce respondents that indicated a 
certification level were certified in Acquisition Logistics, Program Management, 
and Contracting.  The majority of those respondents were certified in Program 
Management at Level II and Level III.  












Level I Level II Level III Area 
132 33.25% 44 15.22% 50 14.25% Acquisition Logistics 
82 20.65% 77 26.64% 97 27.64% Program Management 
55 13.85% 50 17.30% 65 18.52% Contracting 
39 9.82% 38 13.15% 47 13.39% Test and Evaluation 
31 7.81% 39 13.49% 58 16.52% 
Systems Planning, Research, 
Development and Engineering 
21 5.29% 8 2.77% 12 3.42% 
Business, Cost Estimating and Financial 
Management 
16 4.03% 18 6.23% 9 2.56% 
Manufacturing, Production and Quality 
Assurance 
9 2.27% 7 2.42% 9 2.56% Purchasing 
7 1.76% 3 1.04% 1 0.28% Auditing 
5 1.26% 5 1.73% 3 0.85% Industrial/Contract Property Management 
397   289   351     
 
Table 4:  Civilian Certification Levels 
 
Table 5 represents the active military workforce respondents’ certification 
levels.  The greater part of the active military workforce respondents are Level I, 
Level II, and Level III certified in Program Management.  This is an indication 
that Program Management is addressed early in the active military careers and that 
Program Management training may be lacking early on in civilian careers, as 












Level I Level II Level III Area 
30 22.90% 32 30.19% 39 43.82% Program Management 
28 21.37% 17 16.04% 18 20.22% Contracting 
22 16.79% 7 6.60% 6 6.74% Acquisition Logistics 
21 16.03% 18 16.98% 8 8.99% Test and Evaluation 
13 9.92% 18 16.98% 12 13.48% 
Systems Planning, Research, Development 
and Engineering 
6 4.58% 1 0.94% 4 4.49% 
Business, Cost Estimating and Financial 
Management 
3 2.29% 2 1.89% 0 0.00% Industrial/Contract Property Management 
3 2.29% 5 4.72% 1 1.12% 
Manufacturing, Production and Quality 
Assurance 
3 2.29% 5 4.72% 1 1.12% Purchasing 
2 1.53% 1 0.94% 0 0.00% Auditing 
131   106   89     
 




Table 6 and Figure 12 represent positions held by all military and all 
civilian respondents.  The majority of the total respondents are in positions within 
















Number Position Percentage of Total 
1038 Bus Sup Org 24.84% 
96 DPM 2.30% 
108 Ops Org 2.58% 
488 Other 11.68% 
221 PM 5.29% 
91 PEO 2.18% 
245 Program Office Staff 5.86% 
411 Res Org 9.84% 
109 OSD HQ 2.61% 
1371 Tech Org 32.81% 
4178     
 



































            Figure 13 represents the most important knowledge areas as ranked by all 
respondents.  The top five competencies considered most important by all 
respondents were: 1) Team Building, 2) Direction/Goal Setting, 3) Importance of 

















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 13:  Total Responses - Most Important 
 
 
Figure 14 represents the areas in which all respondents have received 
training. The top five were:  1) Professional Ethics, 2) Team Building, 3) 
Importance of Effective Listening, 4) Understanding Leadership Style 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14:  Total Responses - Received Training 
 
 
Figure 15 represents the areas in which all respondents feel they need 
further training.  The five most common answers were: 1) Understanding the Art 
of Conflict Resolution, 2) Strategic Thinking, 3) Understanding Motivational 
Theory, 4) Direction/Goal Setting, and 5) Being a Coach and Mentor.   
 
Figure 16 represents the most important competencies as ranked by 
civilian and active military workforce respondents.  The civilian and active 
military workforce ranked the same top six competencies as being the most 
important: 1) Team Building, 2) Direction/Goal Setting, 3) Importance of 
Effective Listening, 4) Professional Ethics, 5) Being a Coach and Mentor, and 6) 
Strategic Thinking.  It is interesting to note that civilians ranked Importance of 




ranked Strategic Thinking higher.  The remaining competencies shown in Figure  






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16:  Civilian vs. Active Military - Most Important 
  
Figure 17 represents the training received by civilian and active military 
workforce respondents.  The top five competencies in which the civilian and 
active military workforces have received training were:  1) Professional Ethics, 2) 
Team Building, 3) Understanding Motivational Theory, 4) Understanding 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 17:  Civilian vs. Active Military - Received Training 
 
 
Figure 18 represents the need for training as ranked by civilian and active 
military workforce respondents. According to the civilian respondents, the top 
five competencies for which training is needed were:  1) Understanding the Art of 
conflict Resolution, 2) Strategic Thinking, 3) Understanding Motivational Theory, 
4) Direction/Goal Setting, and 5) Knowledge of Personnel Policy.  According to 
the active military workforce, they were:  1) Understanding the Art of Conflict 
Resolution, 2) Strategic Thinking, 3) Being a Coach and Mentor, 4) 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18:  Civilian vs. Active Military - Need Training 
 






VI. SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 
This section of the paper analyzes the survey data and makes noteworthy 
observations.  The research team was extremely satisfied with having nearly 4,200 
respondents to the on-line survey, as this yielded considerable data.  The data 
presented in the previous section of this paper focused on only one aspect of the 
results—i.e., the core competencies deemed important to supporting Army 
Transformation. 
Job category differences contributed additional useful survey results.  For 
instance, the data revealed certain common trends in what civilian and active 
military Program Executive Officers (PEOs) considered the most important 
leadership categories.  Common to both groups were the areas of Team Building, 
Direction/Goal Setting, Developing/Maintaining a Positive Organization, and 
Coaching/Mentoring.  The exceptions to the commonalities were those of 
Understanding Motivational Theory for active military and Employee 
Development for civilans.  It is interesting to note that, perhaps, the culture of the 
two institutions influences responses concerning these two exceptions.  For active 
military, who work in an environment in which advancement hinges on career 
performance, the art of motivating employees is considered more important than 
employee development.  It appears that the difference may be due to military 
leaders’ (Officers’) evaluations, which are driven by their current effectiveness.  
Those, in turn, are dependent on their subordinate’s efficiency.  A civilian leader 
is also evaluated by performance, but the delineating difference is that the civilian 
leader will not be forced out of a job due to a lack of exceptional performance, 
whereas, the active military leader will.  With that in mind, culturally, a civilian 
leader has the luxury of emphasizing an employee’s long-term career 
development, even though this emphasis will not provide immediate feedback to 





leader will negatively affect his/her chances of receiving the requisite successful 
evaluation and required career progression. 
The survey analysis indicated additional differences between civilian and 
active military in the area of training still required.  Out of the top five most 
important areas identified as requiring training, only two areas were common to 
the two categories of leaders.  The PEO’s active military and civilian leadership 
counterparts found that each needed additional training in Direction/Goal Setting 
and Understanding Motivational Theory.  The differences between the two may 
also illustrate cultural differences between leadership categories. The PEO’s 
active military leadership believed that additional training was required for 
Employee Development, Team Building, and Importance of Effective Listening.  
The PEO’s civilian leadership identified additional training required in the areas 
of Persuasion Techniques, Implementing Change, and Understanding the Art of 
Conflict Resolution.  Implementing Change, as it applies to civilian leadership, is 
discussed in much greater detail later in this paper.  
Active military and civilian personnel agreed that the following areas are 
most important for the leadership position of Project Manager (PM): 
Direction/Goal Setting, Professional Ethics, Team Building, Strategic Thinking, 
and Empowerment Importance and Techniques.  Once again, for areas in which 
personnel were already trained, this particular job category demonstrated the most 
commonality between active military and their civilian counterparts.  The five 
areas of agreement in the category “training already received” were: Professional 
Ethics, Team Building, Understanding Motivational Theory, Knowledge of 
Personnel Policy, and Technical Competency.  This indicates that, having 
received similar training, both military and civilian PMs consider the same 
competencies most important to executing the position. 
Another aspect of the survey results worth examining is the type of 
personnel and positions that took the time to respond.  The bulk of Active Military 




(Colonels)—in effect, the preponderance of leadership for the Active Military.  
Similary, the majority of Civilian survey respondents were GS-12s, GS-13s, GS-
14s, and GS-15s, basically the equivalent counterparts of the active military 
survey respondents.  These two groups of respondents provided an excellent 
cross-section of leadership experience for the survey and, as such, allowed the 
research team to identify commonalities and differences between civilian and 
active military leadership competencies. 
While assessing the overall response to the survey, the team identified 
certain trends in what “it took” to execute effective leadership.  These trends 
could best be described as leadership qualities that draw out the will of personnel 
to buy into the mission and support it to a successful conclusion.  As noted above, 
the rank/grades of the respondents comprising core leadership positions seem to 
indicate that the ability to effectively communicate, in whatever form, is such a 
key precept that it almost supersedes all other areas of leadership.  The trend 
denotes that the respondents in leadership positions, both active military and 
civilian, consistently identified the following qualities as important: Providing 
Direction/Goals, Team Building, Being a Coach/Mentor, Effective Listening, and 
Persuasion Techniques.  Although many other leadership areas were considered 
important to mission success, communication and its derivatives have, without 
fail, demonstrated an across-the-board survey trend.  
A closer look at the respondents’ comments offers an interesting 
perspective on successful leadership areas.  The following phrases were the most 
commonly repeated in the respondents’ comments:   
1.        Clear communication (avoiding  
  miscommunication/misinterpretation) 
 
2.        Effective listening, bottomline communication 
 
3.        Direction/goal setting 
 





5.        Team building, motivating people, and simple human interaction 
 
6.        Professional ethics 
 
7.        Individuals assuming leadership positions with no people skills   
 
Interestingly enough, one of the least mentioned leadership areas was that 
of Technical Competency.  This is not to say that technical competency is to be 
downplayed as a key leadership area; however, the area that received the most 
emphasis was successful communication and interaction with others.  One 
respondent made an unusual, but discerning, observation: “I am a manager . . . not 
a leader.  As a manager, I believe my success is due to being highly competent and 
organized.”  This statement reflects a significant difference between “leadership” 



























The semi-structured personal interviews were conducted with civilian and 
military leaders, both active-duty and retired.  The interviewees were a composite 
of senior civilian leaders and military officers including Senior Executive Service 
(SES) members.  Several interviewees were retired military and are currently 
supporting DoD/Army acquisition efforts.  The interview questions were provided 
prior to the interview to allow the interviewee to be prepared to provide more in-
depth analysis and evaluation of the civilian leadership issues.  The template and 
questions are found in Appendix B.  These questions were intended to not only be 
specifically addressed, but also to serve as points of departure to gain additional 
insights and perspectives regarding leadership challenges in support of Army 
Transformation.   
The research team established the premise for the interviewees by noting 
that previous studies have identified substantial differences between civilian and 
military leadership competencies.  The team also noted that our objective was to 
identify core leadership competencies needed by Army civilians to understand, 
embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Acquisition workforce.  The 
semi-structured personal interview questions were: 
 
1.  Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between 
Army civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why?  
(Follow on as appropriate) 
 
2.  What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what 
additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to 
accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation?  i.e., which leadership 






3.  What is your perception of the state of the current training and 
education system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to 
prepare them to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system? 
 
4.  Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among 
civilians and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed 
most important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation.  
Do you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education 
efforts, and what would you recommend to senior executives? 
 
A total of 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted, garnering several 
distinct and common themes.  The most notable themes were: 1) significance of 
leadership experiences; 2) reinforcement of the core leadership competencies 
perceived as most important; and 3) cultural differences between military and 
civilian perspectives towards leadership.   
Each of the aforementioned questions is addressed in the following 
paragraphs and supports the conclusions and recommendations made in this 
paper.  A limited sample of transcribed interviews is provided in Appendix C.  
These examples were selected as they generally represent the span of feedback 
and are indicative of the various viewpoints, particulary the contrasting views that 
are pervasive among civilians and their military counterparts.  The transcripts are 
from interviews with one life-long civilian with no active-duty military 
experience, one active-duty military officer, one retired military officer who is 
now an Army civilian employee, and one former military officer now working for 
private industry and supporting the Army as a defense contractor.   
 
B. DISCUSSION OF RESPONSES 
1.   Question One 
This section evaluates and highlights several of the key findings in 
response to the first open-ended question of the semi-structured interview.  The 





Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between Army 
civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why?  
(Follow on as appropriate) 
 
The majority of interviewees were not aware of specific documented 
differences in competencies, although the generally held opinion was that 
differences did and do exist.  The military respondents were much more assertive 
in their view that differences exist, while civilian respondents tended to agree in 
principle.  Several interviewees knew of documented differences, but were less 
confident regarding which specific leadership competencies were identified as 
being dissimilar.  Participants generally agreed that Army civilian leadership 
training was much less emphasized when compared to the military curriculum, 
and this may be a contributor to those documented differences described in the 
ATLDP assessment.   
All interviewees elaborated on the relative importance of leadership 
training and its corresponding impact on effective leadership.  Those with military 
experience commented on the effectiveness of such focused and deliberate 
leadership development programs.  The civilian respondents acknowledged the 
importance of leadership training, while, at the same time, noting that the civilian 
component of the AAW/AAC has traditionally been function-based.  Put in other 
terms, the majority of civilian respondents, and especially those with no military 
experience, reinforced the notion that long-term technical and/or institutional 
knowledge was the civilian ingredient to Army Acquisition rather than leadership, 
per se.  This contrasting perspective is expanded upon later in this section.      
Some interviewees felt that the differences in competencies did matter, 
while others did not.  The majority of those who felt it did matter had military 
service experience—i.e., those who have experienced leadership development 
opportunities uniquely specific to the active-duty military.  This perspective 




civilian interviewees expressed a differing opinion, commenting that even if there 
were differences, the two were relatively indistinguishable. Former Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Bill Owens (Ret-N) supports this 
contrasting perspective: "The military does a very nice job of training leaders, but 
civilian society doesn't."  He also has remarked that, in many cases, civilian 
organizations do not even realize that leadership is lacking (Williams, 2000).  It is 
noteworthy that both of the above assertions were supported by the findings from 
the semi-structured interviews. 
Most of the interviewees commented on the dynamic instabilities 
associated with the shorter-term (e.g., two to three years for a Program Manager 
or even less for junior and mid-grade officers) military leadership rotations and 
their contrast with the steady-state nature of civilian leadership (longer tenure in a 
leadership position such as civilian program manager, deputy program manager, 
functional/division leadership, etc.).  Those who commented on this situation also 
noted that the fundamental differences between military and civilian leadership 
are embodied in this approach.  Put differently, civilian respondents associated 
this fact with the need for civilian stability, while military interviewees pointed to 
this as a leadership developmental tool.  Although all appear to agree that 
diversity of leadership experiences is a factor for leadership development, this 
may be an indication that existing civilian leadership continues to strongly oppose 
initiatives that support diversity in civilian leadership experiences and 
assignments.  One interviewee remarked, “You think it is a gut instinct (the action 
of leadership), but it all boils down to experience. . . . So what you think is a gut 
reaction is really based on experience and what you have been through and what 
you have seen.  Then you get an inkling of the way to go.”  The subject of 
leadership experience is discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs and 
in other areas of this research paper.       
The active and retired military interviewees generally indicated that 




(i.e., that soldiers are constantly trained for leadership by rotational assignments 
and the subsequent exposures to various leadership experiences) versus the 
functional/discipline-based training approach so prominent among civilians (e.g., 
chief engineers, chief logisticians, etc.).  These cultural differences have been 
widely studied and documented.  References that identify, investigate, and report 
on the cultural differences include works by the Triangle Institute for Strategic 
Studies (Project on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Society, no date) 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press (Soldiers and 
Civilians; The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, 2003).  The 
functional focus of the civilian culture makes it more difficult to embrace the 
ever-changing and diverse opportunities planned, provided, and, more often than 
not, required for their military counterparts.  One military officer commented that 
recent attempts to exploit civilian leadership for growth through the mechanism of 
a mobility agreement met with so much resistance by the civilian workforce that 
concessions from the Army were necessary.  (Army leadership has formally 
retracted the Mobility Agreement requirement (ASA (ALT), 08 May 2006) for 
most Army Acquisition Corps members).   
A common civilian retort that illustrates these different perspectives was 
that private industry follows a functional discipline theory of operation much like 
that of the civilian acquisition workforce; therefore, the civilian paradigm need 
not be affected.  In fact, much has been documented regarding how the contrasting 
perspectives between civilians and military lead to the inability to correlate 
Defense acquisition to private industry (Willis, 2001).  One civilian respondent 
pointed out that some foreign military acquisition officers occupy a single position 
or rank for much more time than their counterparts in our Army.  Contrasting 
perspectives such as this indicate that the cultural differences between military 
and civilian attitudes towards Army Acquisition leadership development may act 
as a barrier to improving Army civilian leadership development.  The research 




The perceived differences between military and civilian leadership 
competencies varied between military and civilian respondents.  Most military 
leaders emphasized that the military’s leadership advantage resulted in a better 
and more efficient fighting force, whereas the civilian respondents emphasized the 
functional nature of the acquisition workforce and its need to maintain functional 
expertise.  The civilian respondents generally defended the differences by noting 
the specific missions of each and their seemingly mutual indifference.  The 
military doctrine is to train leaders, while the civilian charter is to develop, field, 
and sustain military equipment and services.  While it is arguable that 
fundamentally different missions do or do not exist, this does not provide 
adequate support in defense of the inability of the Army to train its acquisition 
workforce in the areas of required leadership competencies.  The debate centers 
on whether the civilian or military model of leadership development should be 
adopted as the single preferred approach.  Either option, or possibly a hybrid 
approach, has fiscal ramifications and should be considered as a possibility for 
future research. 
 
2.   Question Two 
The second question of the semi-structured interview focused on the term 
“Army Transformation” and asked the interviewee to discuss different leadership 
areas of interest related to Army Transformation.  The follow-up portion of the 
question focused on identifying core competencies and other related skill sets 
needed by civilian leadership in order to understand, embrace, and encourage 
transformative change in the Army.  The second question was: 
 
What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what 
additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to 
accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation?  i.e., which leadership 





There was a wide range of responses with respect to the definition of 
Army Acquisition Transformation.  These viewpoints included the intent to 
overhaul and revamp the Army and/or DoD acquisition process(es); the transition 
to a primarily civilian-led acquisition process; a concerted effort to move towards 
the Future Combat System (FCS) approach to warfare (vice the emphasis on our 
current ‘heavy’ force); and the blurring of the service elements (Army, Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine Corps) such that one single DoD (often referred to as ‘purple’) 
has complete and focused control.  While all viewpoints may be considered valid, 
no consensus as to exactly what Army Acquisition Transformation represents or 
intends to accomplish emerged from the interviews. 
All the interviewees regarded Army Acquisition Transformation as 
involving some sort of change or conversion.  All also attempted to define the 
change or conversion with an intended outcome, such as being ‘purple’ or 
migrating towards a groundswell of civilian acquisition leadership.  While there 
was a unanimous opinion that the Army needs to change, there was not unanimity 
as to what the end state will or should be.  One particular response from a retired 
military officer aptly and succintly summarizes the array of responses: “I’m a big 
believer that Transformation has been poorly defined across [the] Department of 
Defense.”  
The second part of this interview question was intended to identify 
specific core competencies required by civilian leaders to effectively lead the 
Army through this Transformation, recognizing that Transformation means many 
different things to different people.  The intent of this part of the question was 
very similar to that of the on-line survey; however, no bounds or predefined limits 
were used to establish acceptable responses.   
Several key core competencies emerged as generally necessary, although a 
wide range of responses were received and many different competencies 




interviewees as essential to the execution of Army Acquisition Transformation 
were: 1) communication, 2) change management, and 3) team-building.  The 
competency areas of communication and team-building correlate quite well with 
the survey results showed in Figures 13 and 16.  The notable exception is the 
change management core competency and that is further addressed in the 
following paragraph.  These results are neither entirely unexpected nor 
inconsistent with prior efforts similar to this research paper.  For example, the 
team-building competency has previously been identified as a fundamental skill 
domain for military leaders (TIP Database, 2006).   
The subject of change management was not ranked as high as the other 
two competencies (communication and team-building), as Figures 13 and 16 
show.  The identification of this core competency as one of the four core 
competencies of the proposed National Security Personnel System (NSPS) (DA 
NSPS Workforce Briefing, 2006) indicates two things: this area may be receiving 
greater attention among Army leadership, and its relative importance is 
underappreciated by or underemphasized to the current acquisition workforce.  As 
a result of the potential transition towards NSPS, recently implemented training 
opportunities are positive steps towards the indoctrination of the civilian 
workforce in the change management core leadership competency. 
 
3.   Question Three 
The third question of the semi-structured interview focused on the 
assessment of the current state and/or availability of leadership training needed by 
civilian leadership to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change 
in the Army.  The question was: 
 
What is your perception of the state of the current training and education 
system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to prepare 





Most interviewees remarked that while the current state and availability of 
civilian leadership training has been much improved, it has yet to rival the 
availability (and, to a large degree, required or at the least expected) for military 
leadership.  Specific leadership training opportunities—such as the Army 
Management Staff College’s (AMSC) Sustaining Base & Leadership Management 
(SBLM) program, the Competitive Development Group (CDG), the Defense 
Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP), and myriad certification 
opportunities provided by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU)—all 
provide leadership development opportunities for prospective Army civilian 
leaders.  Most respondents noted that many more such opportunities exist than 
most civilians may be aware of and that the available training has not been 
secured for potential civilian leaders due to the failure of current Army leadership, 
both military and civilian, to emphasize civilian leadership training.    
Several issues were cited that call into question the effectiveness of these 
training opportunities.  Examples of these issues varied, yet a couple of prominent 
themes emerged from the semi-structured interviews.  Most military (active-duty 
and retired alike) commented that the civilian leadership programs did not “pull” 
from the civilian population, whereas the military approach did.  For example, the 
Command & General Staff College (CGSC) may educate on the order of 50 
percent of all military serving in the Acquisition Corps, yet the percentage of 
civilians attending any one of the aforementioned leadership training programs is 
considerably less.  Another issue cited by most interviewees was the resident 
nature of such leadership training and the perceived negative civilian culture 
regarding lengthy tenures away from home and work.  One respondent contrasted 
the military and civilian approaches and concluded that the civilian leadership 
emphasis is on the individual employee, whereas military leadership 
training/development emphasis is much more directed to the service member’s 




One recurring point from most military respondents and echoed by several 
of the civilian interviewees was that no structured model or required training path 
exists for potential civilian PMs.  There were several references to a perceived 
dichotomy.  While civilian technical positions have certification requirements, no 
such comparable requirement exists for PM positions being staffed or to be staffed 
by civilians.  There is indeed a Program Management acquisition field with 
associated certification requirements, but the vast majority of military respondents 
felt that to be function-based training and emphasized that it was not experience-
based.  The discussion asserting their basis for this perspective ultimately and 
repeatably returned to the relevance of the diversity of leadership experiences.     
 
4.   Question Four 
The fourth question of the semi-structured interview focused on the 
relative importance of the core leadership competencies needed to understand, 
embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Army and what solutions, if 
necessary, the Army should study, pursue, and/or implement.  The question was: 
 
Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among civilians 
and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed most 
important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation.  Do 
you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education 
efforts, and what would you recommend to senior executives? 
 
The key core competencies required to accomplish the mandate of Army 
Transformation varied from one interviewee to the next, for reasons based on the 
discussion above.  Generally speaking, and consistent with the survey data, 
competencies such as Direction/Goal Setting and Team Building were identified 
as core leadership competencies.  Interestingly, and also consistent with the survey 




as compared to military leaders.  Military respondents often remarked that change 
management is a basic tenet, with one respondent remarking that Transformation 
is “leading change into the future.”  These findings are consistent with the survey, 
as shown in Figure 17.  These data represent a potentially fundamental difference 
in opinion between civilian and military personnel as to any specific leadership 
tools required to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change.   
A few of the respondents noted that there did not appear to be a single 
“standout” leadership core competency that emerged from the data.  While it is 
shown that several competencies were notably more important than others, lack of 
any clear key core competency(ies) led some to conjecture that leadership was a 
composite of attributes, some of which may not be developed in an academic 
setting.  Eisenhower’s key leadership elements note that everyone has some innate 
leadership ability (Tyler Institute, no date).  Although outside the scope of this 
thesis, the contribution of this (theoretical) innate ability to the education and 
training of the core competencies needed to ensure success of Army 
Transformation should be considered for further research. 
Most interviewees expressed positive viewpoints regarding Army training 
efforts, especially the technical/functional opportunities available to the civilian 
workforce.  Several responses, predominately from those with military experience, 
suggested that the Army should take a more proactive approach to civilian 
leadership training, making it as available as the technical/functional opportunities 
currently are.  Several interviewees suggested a leadership functional area with 
associated certification levels.  This thesis team fully supports that approach.  
Further research is necessary to determine what educational and experiential 
requirements should be established for the corresponding certification levels, 








One of the four key competency areas identified by the NSPS for effective 
leadership in support of Army Transformation is effective leadership for change.  
The survey responses did not identify this competency as one of the more 
important ones in understanding, embracing, and encouraging transformation 
efforts.  This applied to both military and civilian responses.  It is of particular 
interest to note that the military survey respondents did place more emphasis on 
the need for training in this particular competency than did the civilian 
respondents.  The semi-structured interviews reinforced the importance of 
understanding, appreciating, and implementing required training to address the 
constantly changing environment. 
A large majority of the interviewees did indicate that leadership 
development for the future Army civilian leadership has received a great deal of 
attention, and they agreed that this attention was previously underemphasized.  
Leadership development training currently being provided by the NSPS efforts, 
the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), and various other resources have 
unquestionably raised awareness of the importance of leadership training and its 
significance to the Army’s current and future civilian leadership.  Most of the 
interviewees felt that the Army was effecting positive change and that the Army 
must continue to emphasize the relevance and significance of such focused 
leadership training.  In light of fiscal constraints, the obvious challenge is how 
such a focused civilian leadership training effort will be implemented and 
executed. 
The semi-structured interviews also identified several potential core 
competencies that were not part of the on-line survey.  The most advocated and 
widely accepted leadership competency not specified in the survey was diversity 
of leadership experiences as a result of varying job assignments and experiential 
training.  While most interviewees agreed that this diversity is a key leadership 




leadership experiences for the civilian acquisition workforce would be inadequate 
to meet the needs of Army Transformation.  To further compound the issue, the 
existing cultural differences between the military and civilian workforce may be 
acting as a hindrance to such a solution. 
The interviewees generally reinforced the findings from the nearly 4,200 
responses to the on-line survey: two core competencies needed by the civilian 
leadership and required for successful Army Acquisition Transformation are 
communication and team-building.  The competency of change management 
received much broader recognition from the semi-structured interviews than from 
the on-line survey.  The area of change management has become increasingly 
visible, and its identification as one of the four cornerstones of the DoD NSPS 
program only serves to underscore its importance.  Change management must 
continue to be emphasized to ensure that the present and future civilian leadership 
values its utility and necessity. 
The state of the current Army training and education system to prepare 
civilian (Acquisition) leaders to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system is, 
by and large, quite healthy and beneficial.  The number of opportunities available 
to civilians continues to increase in quantity and quality.  Civilians and military 
strongly agreed that the systems currently in place far exceed the opportunities 
available a decade ago.  The concern expressed by many is that the training and 
education system for civilians depends on the aggressiveness and proactive nature 
of given civilians, unlike the “draw” system in place for the military.  The military 
doctrine values the diversity competency enough to force the rotation, and DoD 





































This section of the research paper summarizes the findings of the research 
team and addresses the statistical significance of the survey.  It also presents 
conclusions drawn from the detailed findings and analysis presented thus far.  The 
research team has generated three specific recommendations, and the section 
concludes with suggestions for further study on this and related topics. 
 
B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Confidence Level of the Leadership Survey 
An important aspect of any survey involves the significance of the data 
with respect to how well the sample data represents the total population.  In this 
case, the survey response of 4,178 is the sample or subset of the total Army 
Acquisition Workforce.  During the conduct of the survey, the total population of 
the acquisition workforce was approximately 48,000, as reported by the Strategic 
Communications Director, U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center.  Thus, the 
population subset represents an 8.7% sample of the total population of 48,000.  
Figure 19 depicts the sample as compared to the total population. 
While the response rate of roughly 9% may seem low, the team had 
several objectives to consider in the design and delivery of the survey.  First, the 
team wanted to design the survey in such a way as to minimize the time needed to 
complete the survey and, secondly, to minimize the time the survey was available 
on the Internet site.  The goal was to collect valid, usable data, but not to 
unnecessarily burden the workforce.  Any survey requires a tradeoff between the 




representative of the total population.  The team viewed the cost of the survey as 
how much burden we were willing to place on the acquisition workforce.  
Consequently, the team did not pursue typical survey methods to boost response 














Figure 19:  Survey Respondents as Percentage of AAW 
 
 
The following sections discuss the level of confidence achieved, based on 
a simple statistical relationship between the survey responses relative to the total 
Army acquisition workforce population. 
 
2. Statistical Significance 
The word “significant” means important to most people.  However, in 
statistics “significant” means probably true and not due to chance (Creative 










true), but not necessarily important.  For the purposes of this survey, the level of  
significance is defined in terms of confidence intervals and confidence levels, as 
discussed in the following sections.   
 
3. Confidence Intervals 
Confidence intervals are plus or minus ranges typically seen in political 
polls.  If you have a confidence interval of 3 and 45% vote for candidate “X in 
your sample data, then you can be relatively sure that if the total population were 
queried, between 42% (45% - 3%) and 48% (45% + 3%) would vote for candidate 
“X”.  How sure you are is defined as the confidence level. 
 
4. Confidence Level 
The confidence level is expressed as a percentage and represents how 
often the actual percentage of the population would select an answer within the 
confidence interval.  In other words, if you have a 95% confidence level then you 
can be 95% certain that the true percentage of the population who will vote for 
candidate “X” lies between 42% and 48% (using the previous example with a 
confidence interval of 3).  The two most common confidence levels are 95% and 
99%, with most researchers using the 95% confidence level (Creative Research 
Systems, 2000).   
 
5. Sample Size 
One of the key factors that determines statistical significance and inversely 
affects confidence intervals and confidence levels is the size of the sample relative 
to the total population.  However, contrary to what one might think, the 
relationship is not linear.  If a sample size is doubled, the confidence interval does 
not decrease by one half.  A simple way to put it is that a larger sample size will 





6. Calculated Confidence Intervals 
The confidence interval can be easily calculated with a known population 
for either a 95% confidence level or a 99% confidence level (Creative Research 
Systems, 2000).  Since most researchers use a 95% confidence level, this team 
selected the same.  The results for a 99% confidence level are provided for 
comparison purposes only.  Figure 20 illustrates the different plus or minus 
confidence intervals achieved under variable sample sizes with a population of 
48,000.  It should be noted that an increase in sample size has a diminishing effect 
on the accuracy of the collected data.  Another interesting fact is that the typical 
media political poll uses a 95% confidence level with a 3% margin of error.  For 
this survey, if the team emulated the political poll accuracy then a sample size of 


















7. Conclusion  
In their “SPSS Survey Tips,” SPSS Incorporated, a leading provider of 
predictive analytics software and solutions, state that there is usually no reason to 
survey more than 1,000 to 1,500 respondents.  SPSS further states that, while the 
precision of results tends to improve as the sample size increases, the increase in 
precision is negligible when sample size is greater than 1,500 respondents (SPSS, 
2004).  One important aspect of determining an acceptable level of accuracy is the 
purpose of the survey.  For example, if a corporation intends to invest millions of 
dollars based on the results of a survey or if potential safety or health implications 
are present, then researchers would naturally want extremely accurate sample 
data.  For purposes of this survey and the construct of the survey, the team is 
satisfied with a 95% confidence that survey responses represent the total 
population with a plus or minus 1.45% accuracy.  This represents twice the 
accuracy of typical media polls on approval ratings or voter preferences.  Based on 
the above, the team concluded that the sample data collected are statistically 
significant and representative of the total acquisition workforce within acceptable 
accuracy limits. 
 
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of the coupling of the survey analysis and the semi-structured 
interview responses, the team identified a strong correlation between the two.  
Without fail, the interviewees repeatedly stressed the same “Most Important” 
competencies that had shown up in the survey results: building the 
team/organization, providing direction/goals, listening to your people, and being a 
coach/mentor.  As the various interview sessions indicated, the above 
competencies do not occur as a form of “management,” but are considered 





To further elaborate on those intangible qualities of leadership, one only 
has to read through the interviews and compare them against the survey results.  It 
is evident that civilians are being asked to perform in leadership positions without 
the requisite experience or cross-section of skills needed to execute.  Both the 
survey and interviews revealed that there are substantial differences in leadership 
methodology and culture between military and civilian organizations.  A common 
topic during the interviews was experience and what the military “forces” its 
future leaders to practice as they are coming up through the ranks.  The military 
offers its future leaders one career path, in that “you will evolve, you will 
compete, and you will grow.”  If the junior military professional does not succeed 
along those lines, then that soldier’s days are numbered in terms of promotion 
potential.  Civilians, on the other hand, are not “forced” to do anything beyond the 
minimum professional career requirements, thus short-circuiting the pathways 
demanded in any interpretation of transformation.  As gleaned from the 
interviews, to “lead” other people in the sense of organization, providing 
direction/goals, and helping shape future leaders through coaching and mentoring, 
a candidate must be exposed to meaningful leadership challenges early on, thereby 
giving him/her crucial experience on which to draw.  If leadership is art and 
science gained primarily through actual experiences, then classroom 
“management” training alone is insufficient to optimize learning.  In short, the 
climate of placing more and more civilians in leadership positions that were once 
occupied by military personnel is becoming increasingly difficult due to years of 
not affording civilians the opportunity to “learn” the necessary skill sets required 
for leadership. 
An additional connection between the survey data and the interview 
findings involves the leaders’ care of the organization.  This was ranked high by 






A leader takes care of an organization.  I am the guy that provides 
resources and a vision.  A leader’s got to be able to provide you a vision of 
what your expectations or goals of where we want to go.  And then it’s my 
job to provide those folks that support the resources to get there.  To me, 
that is what a key leader knows or has to know, he has to be able to  
identify and provide the vision, give them resources, and then identify 
those folks and what motivates them. 
 
This quote alone identified approximately eight leadership competencies 
acknowledged by survey respondents as critical to effective leadership.  This 
interview furnished real-life, proven experiences that positively supported what 
many survey respondents envisioned. 
Another common recommendation gleaned from the interviewees related 
to the Army’s commitment to a program to better train civilian leaders.  The fiscal 
ramifications are enormous.  If the Army is willing to do this early in a person’s 
career, then naturally this may involve expending financial resources on some 
“potential” leaders who may not come to fruition.  That risk is inherent in future 
leadership investment in any organization.  Yet, the military culture appears to 
consistently invest early in its officers and enlisted personnel without necessarily 
receiving optimal outcomes.  
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The team has developed three recommendations as a result of the research 
performed, analysis conducted, and conclusions reached.  It is anticipated that 
these recommendations, if implemented, will contribute to the Army’s efforts to 
successfully undergo transformation, particularly in terms of civilian leadership. 
 
1. Recommendation #1 
A significant finding of this research team was that no specifically 
required or anticipated leadership development plan of action exists for Army 




reaching and beyond the scope of this research paper, the team recommends that a 
civilian leadership development program be defined.  The program should address 
the findings of this research paper regarding core leadership competencies 
necessary for Army Transformation.  Special emphasis should be placed on the 
subject of change management. 
 
2. Recommendation #2 
A recurring theme that resulted from this research paper was the 
drastically contrasting cultural perspectives of civilian and military leadership.  
Although the team focused on identifying core leadership competencies, it was 
readily apparent that these differing cultural perspectives could affect both the 
outcome of this paper and any other leadership implementation effort by DoD or 
DA.  It is recommended that the Service continue to search for methods and 
activities centered on dissolving existing cultural barriers between civilian and 
military leadership—i.e., increasing contact between civilian and military leaders 
in decision-making processes. 
 
3. Recommendation #3 
Although the research team has recommended that the Army implement a 
focused and specific civilian leadership development program, we are aware of 
the myriad opportunities already in existence.  The significance and the 
availability of these training and developmental opportunities appear to be neither 
well-publicized nor strongly supported by senior leadership.  In order to effect 
immediate and positive change, it is recommended that the existing cadre of 
leadership development opportunities be reviewed and potentially mandated as a 
requirement for certain civilian leadership positions.  Army leadership can support 
and reinforce the importance of these training opportunities.  Uniformed and 
civilian leaders alike can adjust organizational climate factors to communicate 




i.e., reward junior civilians with leadership potential by exposing them to and 
asking their opinions on command-wide problems.  The documented gap between 
military and civilian cultures may exist for a reason and, therefore, may never be 
eliminated, but it can be mitigated under the compelling notion of one Total 
Force.     
 
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The research team has developed recommendations for futher study to 
enhance Army Transformation Leadership for tomorrow’s Army civilian 
workforce.  During the course of this research, areas of further research emerged 
on two fronts—one directly related to the topic of this paper and a second one 
related, but not directly, to the topic.  The following paragraphs describe a few 
potential areas of future study and address both fronts. 
The focus of this research team was the Army Acquisition Workforce, and 
its findings and recommendations are applicable to DA.  It is recommended that 
the other services be similarly evaluated to determine to what extent the issues 
apply to the Army alone and to identify service-unique concerns.  These 
evaluations coupled together would serve DoD as well. 
It is suggested that interested agencies contrast and compare the current 
military and civilian leadership development models with a view toward 
implementing a civilian model.  The core competencies required for Army 
Transformation, as outlined in this paper, could serve as the foundation for model 
development.  The technical training models for Army civilians were widely 
regarded as effective.  A leadership development model for Army civilians, to 
include certification levels and corresponding requirements, should be researched 
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The following pages provide screen shots of the web-based survey 
developed by the research team.  To reiterate, the web-based survey was the 
preferred tool for implementation and was developed with time constraints and 
simplicity in mind.  The research team conducted brainstorming sessions, 
literature research, and reviews of leadership programs to establish a wide 
assortment of leadership competencies.  Special attention went to ensuring that the 
competencies selected for inclusion were leadership-related rather than managerial 
in nature.  These competencies were reviewed for redundancy and consolidated 
where appropriate. 
Question #6, depicted in the following screen shots, was modified during 
the course of the survey to allow for a manual entry of an acquisition field in the 
event that the desired field had not been provided.  That update is not reflected in 
the following pages; nor does it detract in any way from the contents of this paper. 
In addition to the on-line survey screen shots, the total consolidated survey 
response data are provided.  These data are all data obtained from Section II of the on-
line survey and form the basis for the conclusions regarding core leadership 
competencies needed by Army civilians to understand, embrace, and encourage 

















































































Total Responses - Most Important 
Number Area Percentage of Total 
2304 Team Building 9.26% 
2149 Direction - Goal Setting 8.63% 
1887 Importance Effective Listening 7.58% 
1705 Persuasion Techniques 6.85% 
1458 Coach 5.86% 
1402 Strat Think 5.63% 
1349 Dev/Main Pos Org Cul 5.42% 
1239 Tech Comp 4.98% 
1178 Emp Dev 4.73% 
1147 Empower Import and Tech 4.61% 
1097 Under Art of Conf Res 4.41% 
837 Impl Change 3.36% 
797 Unders Org Comm 3.20% 
760 Under Motivl Theory 3.05% 
648 Unders Leadership Style Diff 2.60% 
625 Briefing Sr Lev Pers 2.51% 
585 Polit Aware 2.35% 
569 Assump Risk 2.29% 
561 Networking 2.25% 
516 Knowl Person Policy 2.07% 
365 Dev Sens Urg Others 1.47% 
357 Buildi Consensus 1.43% 
326 Bottom Line Comm 1.31% 
315 Time Mgmt 1.27% 
246 Pers Tech 0.99% 
239 Unders Power of  High Expect 0.96% 
232 Effects Humor Work 0.93% 
















3143 Professional Ethics 7.81% 
3095 Team Building 7.69% 
2471 Importance of Effective Listening 6.14% 
2464 Understanding Leadership Style Differences 6.12% 
2140 Technical Competency 5.32% 
1894 Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution 4.71% 
1731 Direction/Goal Setting 4.30% 
1697 Understanding Organizational Communication 4.22% 
1580 Implementing Change 3.93% 
1580 Knowledge of Personnel Policy (both military and civilian) 3.93% 
1566 Being a Coach and Mentor 3.89% 
1532 Employee Development 3.81% 
1515 Understanding Motivational Theory 3.76% 
1433 Strategic Thinking 3.56% 
1342 Empowerment Importance and Techniques 3.33% 
1328 Time Management 3.30% 
1286 Political Awareness 3.19% 
1270 Assumption of Risk 3.16% 
1200 Building Consensus 2.98% 
1140 Developing and Maintaining a Positive Organizational Culture 2.83% 
1011 Briefing Senior Level Personnel 2.51% 
973 Networking 2.42% 
807 Persuasion Techniques 2.00% 
536 Understanding the Power of  High Expectations 1.33% 
527 Effects of Humor in the Workplace 1.31% 
518 Bottom Line Communication 1.29% 
472 Developing a Sense of Urgency in Others 1.17% 








Total Responses - Need Training 
Number Area Percentage of Total 
1720 Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution 4.98% 
1634 Strategic Thinking 4.73% 
1602 Understanding Motivational Theory 4.64% 
1479 Direction/Goal Setting 4.28% 
1466 Being a Coach and Mentor 4.24% 
1464 Knowledge of Personnel Policy (both military and civilian) 4.24% 
1446 Employee Development 4.19% 
1414 Persuasion Techniques 4.09% 
1405 Political Awareness 4.07% 
1402 Developing a Sense of Urgency in Others 4.06% 
1381 Developing and Maintaining a Positive Organizational Culture 4.00% 
1376 Empowerment Importance and Techniques 3.98% 
1302 Understanding the Power of  High Expectations 3.77% 
1298 Implementing Change 3.76% 
1280 Understanding Organizational Communication 3.71% 
1273 Time Management 3.69% 
1229 Team Building 3.56% 
1219 Bottom Line Communication 3.53% 
1202 Importance of Effective Listening 3.48% 
1195 Briefing Senior Level Personnel 3.46% 
1176 Networking 3.40% 
1133 Assumption of Risk 3.28% 
1133 Building Consensus 3.28% 
1122 Understanding Leadership Style Differences 3.25% 
951 Effects of Humor in the Workplace 2.75% 
728 Technical Competency 2.11% 
508 Professional Ethics 1.47% 
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During the course of our studies, it was brought to our attention that 
previous studies have identified substantial differences between civilian and 
military leadership competencies.  The objective of our thesis team was to identify 
leadership competencies needed by Army civilians to understand, embrace, and 
encourage transformative change in the Acquisition workforce. 
 
The following questions helped our team identify leadership competencies 
and possible deltas between military and civilian leadership competencies: 
 
1.  Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between 
Army civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why?  
(Follow on as appropriate) 
 
2.  What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what 
additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to 
accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation?  i.e., which leadership 
competencies (civilian and military) are most needed and why? 
 
3.  What is your perception of the state of the current training and 
education system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to 
prepare them to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system? 
 
4.  Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among 
civilians and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed 
most important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation.  
Do you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education 































APPENDIX C.   SELECTED INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
 
This appendix contains selected transcripts from several of the semi-
structured interviews conducted by the research team.  These are a cross-section 
of responses from civilian and military personnel and are provided to illustrate the 
contrasting perspectives discussed in the paper.  The transcripts are from one life-
long civilian with no active-duty military experience, one active-duty military 
officer, one retired military officer who is now an Army civilian employee, and 
one former military officer now working for private industry and supporting the 








At one time I could probably answer this more specifically, but I studied a little bit 
of this, especially when I was a mid-grade officer.  No, I am not specifically aware 
of specific documented differences or competencies.  I had a general appreciation 
of differences.  To a certain degree, you have to go back to how the Army runs or 
how the Army, and even the DoD, has organized itself to use military and civilian 
members of the force.  Beyond operational differences (military leaders doing 
their thing in the field and the pure warfighting type skills), we have the 
leadership of people, specifically at the junior level, and at a higher level it still 
includes people but you becomes leaders of organizations as well as a leader of 
leaders function; training and development of people (members of the workforce) 
but also training and development of leaders as intermediate leaders.  A little bit 
of difference there.  In the field of warfighting, you still have those flavors but 
military officers are generally trained in a broad portfolio of skill sets (you might 
say a generalist of a certain sort) and civilians are trained to a certain depth of 
expertise.  I wouldn’t want to say specialists but they spend more time and drive 
their opportunities through deeper skill sets where the military tends to drive its 
officers into an appreciation of skill sets and some competency but then more skill 
sets if you will, a diversity of skill sets.  Then you get into the acquisition world 
and you see how those skill sets are overlaid and when you get to courses such as 
the advanced PM course, that’s where you see the difference.  You see where the 
military and civilians come together and you realize that the military are exposed 
in their career development, you know having a junior officer, you’re exposed to 
things like you see from some of the officers around here, what you see in the 
captains and majors, they spend some time working in logistics, they spend some 
time working in engineering, they spend some time working in test, they spend 
some time in a project office, they also spend some time outside of a project office 
working in contracts, they spend some time doing some IT work, so they get some 
measure of competency, but they’re not the IT guru, they’re not the test guru, 
they’re not the log guru, but they have a measure of competency based upon some 
measure of knowledge and competency.  And so when they’re promoted and 
moved on to other organizations, they can then start to see how well the skill sets 
are blended.  In the civilian world you tend to get a diversity of assignments 
within a career field if you will.  So you have engineers who get deeper and 
broader into the engineering world, but maybe not so much in the log world or 
acquisition/contracting.  But that’s ok as long as all the skills are blended together, 
which is good.  Now you get your senior leaders, whether they’re military or 
civilian, you’re trying to crash these guys together to work together.  And when 




such as the acquisition world trying to develop civilian PMs.  Which is a little 
unsettling for some of the career fields for some of the civilians who have been in 
a career field where it is commonplace for them to be trained and developed and 
groomed to be directors of engineering or logistics or the Acquisition Center.  
Eventual RDEC leaders and the IMMC leaders, things like that.  Now, the OSD is 
to pull back on the military complement of acquisition program management.  It 
doesn’t necessarily have to be a military person to be a PM.  You guys (civilians) 
are doing it.  But you have to have the skill sets.  But when you have them 
compete for PM boards, what’s the problem?  We don’t have enough civilians.  
Now you get back to the competencies.  Most of those military have been trained 
to be able to handle and balance the portfolio of skill sets.  Civilians have been 
trying to develop a portfolio of skill sets within a career field.  So now you get 
into things like CDG, trying to develop civilians in other career fields, get exposed 
to that to have them more competitive for other career fields or to be a civilian 
PM. 
 
Interviewer:  So is it fair to say that you are not aware of a documented difference, 
per se, but fundamentally the two institutions vary in how they develop leaders. 
 
Right.  It all starts with what you expect a military leader to be and what you 
expect a civilian leader to be in this environment.  On the one hand, the DoD is 
finding it somewhat expensive to have military people committed to the 
acquisition world, especially when they’re trying to thin out the military out of the 
office environments if you will.  And put their ratio of officers in line units.  So 
who’s going to backfill those leadership positions that the military has in the 
civilian/corporate world?  Why can’t they do it?  They can do it.  It’s not a matter 
of can’t do it, it’s a matter of were they trained to do it?  The military were.  
That’s what the military does.  They spend your life training and developing it and 
as soon as they get good at doing something, they go somewhere else.  That’s 
been the classic problem.  As soon as they got comfortable with something, got 
great at something, it’s time to move.  And they keep doing it over, and over, and 
over.  And after a while, you just get used to it and pick up the ball and run with 
it.  You stay in your lane with the ball and just keep going.  So why aren’t the 
civilians doing that?  Because they’re doing what they’re supposed to be doing.  
So that’s the difference between the military and civilians and how they’re trained 
and developed.  We’re getting better at it with the civilians.  There have been 
things like the CDG.  We have the DLAMP.  We have these other various career 
developing programs to expose and get more of that broad expertise without 
pushing too far out of their lane, but also getting exposed so that they can compete 
more successfully in these other roles.  But you also have to realize there is a 
certain measure of training development to be a PM as opposed to say a director 
of engineering or a director of log, director of acquisition/contracting or 








Fundamentally, transformation is the adaptation of where we are today in 
anticipation, not in response, but in anticipation, of what we need to be doing and 
how we need to behaving in the environment we expect that will reveal itself 
when tomorrow becomes the present.  Leading change into the future.  It’s one of 
those projecting yourself over the horizon and laying claim to what’s going on out 
there and then coming back to the present and saying ‘OK, here’s what I need to 
be to be prepared for when the sun comes up and tomorrow becomes today is 
what I’ve got to be doing.’ 
 
Interviewer:  An interesting data point from our survey results show that, given 
that transformation fundamentally means change, civilians we’ve spoken to don’t 
like change (for example, the pushback from mobility statements) [Note, this 
interview was not conducted in the pre-ordered manner].  But one of the four core 
competencies/functional areas is change management.  Does civilian culture and 
civilian academia associated with leadership not adequately address, change, 






I don’t think it’s gone nearly far enough.  I think it’s too shortsighted.  It’s like if 
you want to do that, you have to pursue consideration of the overhead to train the 
military, why wouldn’t you have comparable overhead in training civilians?  The 
CDG gets you that.  The CDG offers a 3-year program to go and functionally be 
on a sabbatical for 3 years from your career field.  But you’re not prearranging, 
you’re actually negotiating assignments that are complemented to your career field 
but gives you the opportunity to go try something entirely different.  If you’re a 
contracting person, you get to go work in a PM shop.  You can do that for 6 
months working with logistics, maybe working engineering.  Now you have to 
realize you can’t throw somebody in that has no clue what they’re talking about 
but you can put them in an environment where they can get exposed and still 
provide value-added.  The CDG folks have to be value-added.  That exposure 
gives them a lot of benefit that will then be networked in with other benefits and 
other skill sets that they develop.  Here’s the other thing, mid-level career.  The 
Army has a junior career development; they have junior schools (Officer Basic 
Course, Officer Advanced Course) that are line unit skill sets.  They have the mid-
career course (CGSC) that you go through and you refresh yourself on the way the 




go resident and basically take a year sabbatical to be in school for a year.  And the 
others that didn’t get selected had the opportunity for a non-resident slot.  But the 
point is that everyone gets exposed to doctrines of how divisions operate, 
doctrines of how Corps operate, how the Army operated in the field, the Combat 
Arms, the logistician, the other services, that’s when you start to expose everyone 
to how the Army and Air Force work together, how does the Army and Navy 
work together, what is joint, what is purple versus green or other colors of blue.  
You get exposed to these things and you start to think in a broader scheme.  So 
that way, when you go into your future roles as a division officer, staff officer, or 
commander or future battalion commander/brigade commander, you say, you 
know, I’m part of the bigger picture.  And I know how all of those things are kind 
of connected but maybe I’m not an expert at it, but I know there’s something out 
there.  I am exposed to the operational doctrine or the acquisition doctrine, 
resource management, maybe just basic finances, manpower 
management…you’re exposed to all of that kind of stuff.  You get all that as part 
of your mid-career school and in the military; it’s deliberate to be quite honest 
with you.  If you want to be a future leader, you have to be exposed to this.  
Because you have to be good at personnel management, human resources.  You 
have to be good at your command budget.  You have to be good at it.  We didn’t 
say you have to be an expert at it.  Why?  Because you have all these other experts 
in your shop.  You can have a civilian who knows everything there is to know 
about finances.  You can have a civilian who knows everything there is to know 
about contracts.  You have to make sure they’re oriented in the right direction and 
that they are appropriately staffed and resourced to go do their job and you have to 
make sure its blends together for a good outcome. 
 
Interviewer:  Isn’t all that training available to all civilians? 
 
It’s a very thin slice.  How many civilians go to the equivalent of CGSC?  They 
have the SBLM, which now pulls them in.  They didn’t used to pull them in, they 
didn’t used to.  They also have the Army Management Staff College and they’ve 
gotten better over the years. 
 
Interviewer:  But the difference between the civilian and military activities is that 
no ‘forcing function’ exists on the civilian side. 
 
That’s part of the problem here.  They are all opportunities.  A lot of it is you have 
to self-nominate yourself.  With the military, there is a ‘draw’ function.  If you 
want to get promoted, you must go.  Ninety percent of the lieutenant colonels 
went to CGSC resident program.  It’s one of those ‘we’re not going to make you 
go to CGSC’ (although your assignments officer is going to assign you to CGSC); 





Interviewer:  Why would you do that? 
Exactly.  It’s one of those, if you want to get promoted, you’re going to go.  You 
know that.  You can decline it, but you realize you probably might not get 
promoted.  And if you are not promoted, you are on a timeline to get out of the 
Army.  It’s one of those ‘that’s the way it is’.  It’s not ‘I’m doing a great job, why 
can’t I be promoted to be a lieutenant colonel anyway?’  As part of the career 
model, we expect the lieutenant colonels to know the stuff that the CGSC 
provides.  We expect the brigade commanders to know the stuff that War College 
provides.  Because they know what went into the school and they expect that stuff 
to be in your heads when you’re in these various leadership positions.  Why?  
Because they expect performance out of you.  At that level.  With those skill sets 
in mind because when they walk up to somebody they already know the kind of 
things you’ve been exposed to.  So here are the problems I’m going to throw out 
at you.  That’s what senior leadership does.  I’m throwing you to the front.  I have 
an expectation that you are going to be able to handle it.  You’re going to be able 
to take the ball and run with it.  Because guess what?  Senior leadership has 
bigger problems.  They have longer-term problems and they need someone to 
provide solutions, maybe an outcome.  So, they’re looking for help.  So they’re 
looking for everyone below them to pick up the ball and run with it.  So, by 
design, military officers are put in the position that says ‘if you want to be part of 
the future Army, you have to be promoted, and if you want to be promoted, you 
have to go to school, and if you want to go to school, you have to be good in your 
job performance, you have to indicate your initiative and motivation, you have to 
do the things that demonstrate you want to step up and move on, and if you do 
that, you’ll be nominated for school, you’ll be competitive for school, you’ll get 
selected for school, go to school, get follow-on assignments that draw on that 
education…’  It’s just an iterative thing.  It keeps going.  But the officers know 
that if you step off the track, the track moves on and you don’t.  So here’s the 
question, where is that in the civilian world?  Where is that in civilian modeling?  
In the civilian modeling, it’s more of a . . . it’s been a hard thing to get our own 
leadership to make the offering.  Now the next thing is that the Army and DoD did 
try to do things such as the Mobility Assignment.  But there was pushback.  See, 
that’s part of the problem.  The military, we can be told ‘Let’s see, today’s Friday . 
. . you’ll be in Kuwait Monday for 6 months.’  We’re in a role that has few 
responses (e.g., ‘yes sir’, ‘do I have time to pack?’).  Not ‘Uh, you sure?  Can I 
refuse to go to Kuwait?’  But in the civilian world a response might be ‘I don’t 
think so’.  And so part of that problem is with the civilian/career modeling and 
have they articulated the opportunities, but how much of a draw is there?  As part 
of the military, we move and are exposed to different things and when you try to 
do that with the civilians, and of course we pay for that, the military, we pay for 
the cost to PCS, to move household goods, we pay for it.  Does the Army do that 
for civilians?  They do have programs to allow for that.  But civilians have to 




after they move, they still have viable career growth/progression as part of the 
plan.  So it’s not just, and that’s been part of the lack in the modeling, that if you 
have a civilian who competes for a PM and they do get accepted to PM, then 
they’ll be PM for maybe 5 years instead of 3 years, something like that.  Little bit 
longer, maybe 10 years.  But the point is ‘after PM, then what’?  The Army has a 
hard time figuring out what they do.  All of a sudden, it’s ‘well they did great as a 
PM, now what do we do with them?’  Do we keep them as a PM forever and a day 
until they retire?  You can do that in other jobs, or until the job gets redefined.  
But with the way the military does it, they are always rotating people through.  
The whole model is a population-development model.  So where is the 
population-development model for the civilians?  It’s kind of funny that we rotate 
people in and out of PM shops, we rotate people in and out of staffs.  Not only do 
we expect outcome from them, by being in the job it’s a training opportunity for 
the next step.  So we expect outcome but they’re also being developed.   Well, 
while they’re doing that we’ve also got someone else so we want to move these 
guys on to go do the next step.  And in the meantime we’ll bring someone else to 
do the outcome and be developed.  So every job is a developing opportunity for 
something else.  In the meantime the Army’s getting outcome.  By doing that, not 
only are you training individuals, you’re training the population.  Where is that for 
the civilian workforce?  Where is the population-development that will draw the 
individual into the model?   Where is the Army saying ‘I need future engineering 
leadership to train and develop junior engineers’ for example.  So how are we 
going to draw them in and make it that they want to make the moves?  In 
engineering, it’s a discipline, and I need someone who’s skilled in electronic 
engineering/engineering for electronic systems as well as engineering for 
hardbodies (tanks, etc.) and engineering for sophisticated sensors and electronics 
you might find in a missile or helicopter.  Do we have some program that takes 
engineers as part of their career model that takes them from, say, an RDEC or a 
program office that is in Huntsville and then take them to Warren to Ft. 
Monmouth and back to Huntsville?  Is there anything like that that says ‘Oh, so 
one day you might be integrating a missile onto a hardbody which is sophisticated 
electronics?’  Somebody that’s been three of those points on the triangle could 
probably say something like ‘I know how to do that because I already figured out 
the problems in each of those skill sets and I know how to take advantage and 
mitigate the problems with the other guy’s skill sets.’  So you have some senior 
guy around here who says ‘You, sensor guy, this is a complicated issue and you 
need to have that conversation with the hardbody guy and you need to have that 
other conversation with the sensors guy’ and just pull it all together.  Where is 
that?  Whereas in the military we get exposed to that so I can say ‘test guy, why 
aren’t you talking to the engineer?  The guy has a solution.  You need to talk to 
him.  And by the way, you two guys talk to the logisticians so that way you can 
solve his problem before he gets to it because, guess what, you need to consider 




consume that problem later out in the field’.  It’s one of those kind of things 
where it’s not hard to do when you’re doing it; it’s just that you got to think, it’s 
got to be something that you’ve been exposed to that ought to be a part of the 
conversation.  So where is the career modeling that gets you exposed you to 
different assignments that get you to naturally think in a broader, universal set 
while you’re still simply working in your lane.  You get somebody that has that 
exposure in their lane and someone who’s never had that exposure who was 
always stove-piped in a single community and what they are doing on a day-to-
day might look the same, but their impact is on a curve.  The impact of the guy 
that has been exposed to more things and is competent and brings that into his job 
somehow, it seems to go better or there is a longer/more effective ranging effect.  
So ‘why is that guy better’?  They both have the same discipline, they’re both 
equally competent, but one’s been exposed to something a little more, a little 
differently, maybe not to the depth of the other guy.  So that’s when you have to 
manage the niches.  Sometimes you do want someone who is deep.  Deep as in the 
deepest mind in something cause they are the guys that, and they’ve got to love it, 
you’ve got allow them to get their conversations that their glad to do it and they’re 
paid to have fun. 
 
Interviewer:  But that’s specificity. 
 
Exactly, but they would not be suited to be a chief engineer of a multi-disciplined 
office.  But that goes back to where is the career modeling that takes these guys 
who haven’t been exposed to broader things, trains and develop them to higher 
things?  But of course part of that training and development they do realize the 
more you train and develop them in broader areas, the less deep you can go no 
matter how deep you want to.  Now you get into, even in the military, we have to 
watch out for people that are excited about certain technological gains or guys that 
are operational.  Some of the common failings if there’s an issue.  Sometimes it’s 
the senior leader who remembers what it was like to be a little bit lower level and 
kind of gets in the knickers of the lower level leaders, that kind of thing.  Starts 
getting into a micromanagement or interference problem.  That’s one of those 
challenges of self-discipline, organizational discipline.  You get a brigade 
commander that wants to get in the battalion commander’s business.  No, you be 
the brigade commander and let the battalion commander do battalion commander 
stuff.  Well, let the 0-6 PM do 0-6 PM stuff and let the 0-5 PM do his thing and 
provide oversight and tutelage to the 0-5 PM but let the 0-5 PM be an 0-5 PM.  
And for the chief engineer, let the yeoman engineer do his job.  You know, 
provide some mentoring and some counseling and all that.  The higher you go, the 
more you have to look for a total synthesis that everything is in balance and has a 






Because the deeper you go into something, all of a sudden you get into somebody 
else’s knickers and you’re not paying attention, like if you’re digging deep into the 









Civilian Deputy to a PEO, SES 
 
 
Question 1:   
 
I think in the past that was probably true.  What I think the issue is now, if there is 
an issue, is a failure to communicate over and over and make the civilian 
workforce aware of what’s really available to them.  It’s a great deal.  In my last 
position I had two guys at the same time working on their PhDs.  All they had to 
do was get accepted and come ask.  At that time we had a panel at the PEO level 
that reviewed things to see what was going on but it was a formality. 
 
Interviewer:  Is it fair to say that you are aware of differences?  Does it matter? 
 
I would say that 5-10 years ago, that was very true.  I think those differences now 
are very isolated and I think the difference in where they are is the aggressiveness 
of the civilian to want the training because he knows he can survive in the job 
without the training where the military absolutely has to have it.  So I think if the 
civilian is just as aggressive as the military and has a little patience, it’s there. 
 
Interviewer:  So does it matter? 
 
I don’t think so.   
 
Did you have trouble getting into this program?   
 
Interviewer:  No, if I had my own checkbook.  My case is interesting in that I was 
not board selected but was sponsored by ASC assuming my project office funded 
the effort which I’m fortunate they agreed to do. 
 
With rare exceptions, funds should not be an issue.  Not when we’re talking about 
people who want to go on and better themselves.  You’re better skilled and better 
trained to do the job.  If you’ve got a project office that’s telling you they don’t 
have funds, I don’t buy that.  You can get funds to do the right thing.  Yes, there 
may be some rare cases but a lot of this has to do with the organization and there 
are examples out there.  There is one organization here that won’t even pony up 
the money for folks to go to a 2-3 week course.  So a lot of it has to do with 
attitude.  Very few people in that organization are in the Acquisition Corps 
because they haven’t had the courses.  And now that we’re doing LCMC and 
those people are moving into the project offices, those people can’t compete.  
They don’t belong to the Corps and a lot of them aren’t even Level I in their 
career fields.  So those pockets such as this organization are the real issues.  The 





Interviewer:  I recently noticed that measures are being taken to enforce the 80 
CLP requirement.  Will this institute change? 
 
Well they would already have if they’d pay attention to LTG Yakovac.  He’s a big 
supporter of all this and has tried to push this down.  My opinion is that the barrier 
is not there.  It may be put there by someone in management within a given 
project office.  If you want a master’s degree and your project office puts up a 
barricade, elevate it.  And get in line.  I’m not saying you should be able to get a 
PhD or a master’s the first 30 minutes you want to do it, but you get in line.  And 
it should not be denied.  
 
Interviewer:  My project has always been fully supportive so I’m interested in 
what motivates these ‘pockets of resistance’. 
 
It’s just been a mindset.  They do have funding issues at these organizations, 
there’s no doubt about that.  I think these funding issues could have worked and 
should have been worked.  Now there is some question.  If the military guys don’t 
get the training in the window, their careers are over because they are not going to 
the next level of responsibility.  Now you can without a master’s. 
 
Interviewer:  Without a master’s? 
 
Absolutely.  There is some difference there.  Obviously there are some courses 
where the military, by the nature of the way they’re set up, will be the first 
assigned and civilians will get the remaining slots.  But by and large I think that if 
the attitude is right in the project office/organization, the training is available.  
Don’t be surprised if the training for the Corps as you know it now will change 
dramatically and it depends on the internal idea of the Army leadership.  Some 
people think that the Acquisition Corps has been stressed so much that it has 
particularly damaged military careers.  It’s because they get so few promotions to 
the General Officer level and the record speaks for itself.  So if you’re a military 
officer and you are looking at the Acquisition Corps, the Acquisition Corps is not 
your friend.   
 
Interviewer:  Is this a migration away from military leadership to the civilian 
population in the Corps? 
 
Yeah, well in the middle of this is a plan to move SESs around every 3 years.  I’m 
all for training the workforce but the first issue is that you have to look at the 
mission.  And my mission is not to train the workforce.  Don’t get me wrong it’s 
just that it is not my number one mission.  They have to be trained but my mission 




you want to put with them.  Now I’ll give you industry as an example.  If you take 
someone who’s been in accounting in a large corporate entity for 25 years and you 
suddenly say ‘I think it’s time that I moved you down to logistics because it will 
make you a better-rounded manager’, that part may be true.  But what happens to 
that investment and expertise?  You do not see industry moving people around for 
permanent reassignments into different areas for 3-4 years just to train the 
individual.  It’s very rare.  There’s usually something behind it.  What you have is 
someone who is expert and he is continually being trained in his area of expertise.  
So as an example, how smart would it be to put someone in a, say PEO position, 
who has absolutely zero acquisition experience?  You can do that at the higher 
levels, you can move people into those positions, you can move someone into the 
MILDEP 3-star position someone with no acquisition experience, if you want to.  
But that sends the workforce a chilling message.  So you can go all the way to the 
top and not be in the Acquisition Corps.  But there are a lot of jobs you can’t do in 
the project office without being in the Acquisition Corps.  So we’re sending the 
wrong message here.  Why do you need a GS-13 in the Acquisition Corps to 
advance when you could in fact have a MILDEP who has no acquisition 
experience?  Now there are some in Army leadership who would argue with that 
and say ‘If you can lead or manage, you can lead or manage anything’.  Yeah, to a 
point but it’s painful for some people.  
 
Interviewer:  So what do we do about it? 
 
Well I think that part of it is broken.  That’s just my opinion.  I think we need to 
be more careful about how we start moving SESs around and that’s the latest 
thing (to move them every 3 years).  To what, I don’t know.  If you’re in the 
Acquisition Corps, will you be moved to another Acquisition Corps position or if 
this PEO retires, will the new civilian PEO be Acquisition Corps civilian or just 
civilian?  I don’t know but I think it’s important that we pay attention to those 
things and I think it’s important to train, don’t get me wrong, but you have to 
understand what your mission is and you need well-trained people but not at the 
sacrifice of 3 to 4 years of poor leadership or unclear leadership by someone who 
is not qualified in that career field.  I don’t go to a lawyer to get my books 
balanced and file my income tax; I go see an accountant.  So to me, we just need 
to keep focus.  Rounded training is great and I support it.  You need to have that 
early in your career.  That’s the time to move.  It doesn’t do any good to move a 
guy who’s been a chief engineer for 25 years down to logistics.  Can they do it?  
Yeah.  And in some cases it is good to get new blood in.  But you have to be 
careful.  And I can recall a recent thrust to rotate Deputy PMs in the PEO.  That 
ended up not being done and would have been a mistake to have that mass 








Which are you referring to?  Army Transformation or Army Acquisition 
Transformation?  Because they are two different subjects.  If you want to irritate 
some of the leadership today, talk about Streamline Acquisition.  Because they’re 
not buying it.  The reason for it is that everyone didn’t go to the classes.  How 
many times have you been to an acquisition seminar or class and you saw the test 
community represented?     
 
Interviewer:  Not too many times. 
 
That’s right.  So when you talk about acquisition streamlining or transformation, it 
was not a full buy-in.  You can see system after system where we’re not only 
testing not as much as we used to; we’re testing more.  So their interests weren’t 
addressed.  They don’t care about ‘lean’, they don’t care about ‘streamlining’ the 
acquisition process, they care about ‘right’ and in some cases it’s ‘right’ to a fault.  
So that, to me, is something we need to take a look at.  But I think the 
transformation of the Army and acquisition transformation are two different 
subjects.  Transformation of the Army is necessary, all the time.  That’s a living 
activity.  The problem is where is it going? 
 
Interviewer:  What’s the end-state? 
 
That’s the unknown. 
 
Interviewer:  A number of people have very strong opinions as to what they think 
the end-state should be.  They all agree that transformation is change of some sort, 
but what the result of that change ends up being is different. 
 
What I think the issue is FCS and that’s a prime example.  If you ask 10 people 
what FCS is, you’ll get at least 9 definitions.  And my response to that is ‘OK, if 
you can’t define it, how can you buy it?’  And I think that’s part of the issue.  
What’s affordable?  What’s FCS?  FCS is a big communication system.  And if 
we keep going like we’re going now, some of our legacy systems are going to die 
on the way to FCS due to lack of funding and support.  And we’ve walked away 
from some too early.  So I think there is an issue with what to do with FCS.  Can 
you afford the war, Katrina, and FCS?  And the answer is ‘No, we can not’.  Ok, 
Katrina is what it is.  The war is there.  So the option is FCS.  And to be able to 
get focus where you need it, and to get expenditures under control (and to me this 
is part of acquisition transformation), you need to get that focus. 
 
Question 3:   





Question 4:   
 











































Retired Military (Colonel), Human Resources Command 
 
 
Question 1:   
 
The answer is yes I am aware of the differences.  I spent quite a bit of time 
studying the difference in competencies between Army civilians and the military.  
To be honest with you, the military acquisition community is a separate category 
from the military to see if they needed separate competencies and if so, what kind.  
It does matter and the reason I believe in that is that it’s not so much that they 
need to be different, but those areas where they need to be the same where there’s 
currently not a professional development program to make them similar.  For 
example, the Army has competencies that it goes by and the Joint services has 
their version of competencies and DA civilians need to be fully inculcated and 
aware and have a basis of competencies that support the Joint warfighter.  The fact 
that we have service component competencies is history.  We are all Joint 
warfighters.  That includes not only those that are in the military, but the military 
Acquisition Corps and the DA civilians.  And all of those folks need to have 
similar competencies when it comes to interagency coordination, multicultural 
awareness, how to deal with change, or a host of other competencies that are out 
there.  My emphasis would be on where they need to be similar and less so where 
they need to be different.  Most of the differences I see are in technical aspects of 
civilian personnel management as opposed to the actual competency in doing your 
job.  So the bottom line is yes, it does matter and most importantly why it matters 
is why they need to be more similar and the story I told earlier was why the 
Defense Acquisition University should be developing good leaders and should be 
using common Joint competencies but in fact recently in acquisition was that they 
just purchased the Air Force competencies off the shelf because it was cheaper.  
And if you compare the Joint competencies to the Air Force competencies, you’ll 
realize that the Joint ‘emerging’ competencies are much better suited to 
developing leaders for the future than the current Air Force competencies being 
used by a Joint service academy. 
 




Interviewer:  Before you answer the next question, it seems that ‘Transformation’ 
means many different things to many different people.  For some it seems to be a 
desired end-state, for some it’s a process, and it may mean something else to 






I’m a big believer that Transformation has been poorly defined across (the) 
Department of Defense.  Each person will have a separate definition of 
Transformation.  If you talk to the Army maneuver guys, they will generally 
associate Transformation with Modularity.  New equipment, network-centric 
warfare, that sort of thing.  If you go to the DoD Acquisition/Logistics website, 
they pretty much define it as a process, i.e., Transformation is simply change and 
how you manage that change.  Since we’re going through a revolution in network-
centric operations, we have to be able to manage that.  So, I’m a big believer in 
Transformation and I think I side with the Army Acquisition Workforce in that 
Transformation is simply change and change management, how you visualize the 
future, and how you change the culture and competencies to meet that future 
effectively.       
 
Interviewer:  Another emerging theme from our research, and you used the term a 
second ago, is culture.  We’ve done some research and found that cultural 
differences between civilians and military are much more 
pronounced/documented than we originally knew of.  If you had a thought or two 
on cultural differences and ways to bring them closer together, I’d like to capture 
those.   
 
I think the biggest cultural difference that I see is when the Army came up with 
something called the ‘Warrior Spirit’.  And their definition of the Warrior Spirit, 
this was probably about 4 years ago, included DA civilians.  And the bottom line 
is that the definition says ‘getting things accomplished in spite of limited 
resources, constraints, you name it’.  Bottom line is getting things done and 
figuring out how to get things done.   That takes ingenuity, creative thought, it 
talks about being goal-oriented, all those things they teach you from the very 
beginning of the Army culture but aren’t necessarily taught (to civilians) for two 
reasons.  One is that the civilians don’t have the corresponding schooling.  They 
don’t have Airborne school, they don’t have Ranger school, the Basic courses that 
you have to graduate from.  And two, they don’t have the job experiences that 
help them to figure out how to get things done in leadership roles with limited 
experiences.  And probably a third, which is part of the schooling, is that they 
don’t have the historical education, the history background, which also lends itself 
to understanding the role and what we’ve done in the past and how we’ve gotten 
that accomplished.  So, I would say that the culture is probably pretty much based 
on those areas, both schooling and job experiences.  If there’s one specific cultural 
difference, I would argue that it’s in the Warrior Spirit era. 
 
Interviewer:  You mentioned the differences in job experiences and that also 
appears to be an emerging theme.  Your tool set is comprised of a certain set of 





Part of the problem is that there aren’t good measurements to metrics on how to 
measure leadership competency.  For example, when you are a brand new 2
nd
 
Lieutenant in the Infantry, which probably correlates to maybe a GS-7, you are put 
in charge of 30 people.  Now I don’t think there are any GS-7s, if any at all, who 
have the definition of being a supervisor in charge of 5 people.  So all those skill 
sets that you get from being in charge of 30 people, teaching them individual 
skills and how to operate as a unit, is simply something the DA civilian doesn’t 
get as far as job experiences are concerned.  So he doesn’t have that background 
which leads to our great big cultural difference.  And when you are in charge of 
greater and greater organizations, you learn different tools for managing them 
such as empowerment, such as mission-oriented command and control where you 
tell them and paint the picture of what you want to get done.  But you don’t tell 
them how to get it done.  You don’t have the ability to micromanage because you 
have so many people and tasks to get done and so there is some cultural 
differences there with basic management principles between the different cultures 
also.       
 
Interviewer:  ‘The inability to micromanage’? 
 
Now there are plenty of micromanagers in the Army.  But I think you get more 
experience learning how not and how to empower your folks simply because 
you’re put in a situation where you have to in order to get something done.   
 
Interviewer:  I just haven’t viewed it in that perspective before. 
 
In the military, in between the Lieutenant and Captain years, you have to go from 
seeing everyone who works for you to going to a field exercise where you have to 
visualize where they are and what they’re doing.  And that really is a leap as far as 
starting to get out mission-oriented statements to your subordinates as opposed to 
being able to look over their shoulder for everything they’re doing.  So you 
develop what I think are better management techniques and skill sets.   
 
Question 3:   
 
Limiting my comments to civilian acquisition leaders, I would say that the 
training and education system is superb when it comes to technical competence.  It 
has significant shortfalls when it comes to management, leadership, and basic 
dealing with people.  We have often done workforce surveys for the acquisition 
workforce here at Redstone, we’ve done focus groups, and even strategic off-sites, 
and the recurring theme we get over and over and over again is ‘he’s a great 
engineer or he understands the acquisition process, but he doesn’t have the human 
skills’.  And that makes an organization dysfunctional.  Even little things such as 




information.  Having minutes or an agenda for a meeting?  How are you going to 
bring everyone together and coordinate their efforts?  Those sorts of skills are  
lacking in the Army civilian acquisition workforce.  However, DAU goes a great 
job with the technical skills.   
 
Question 4:   
 
Interviewer:  We talked earlier about our survey data and we appear to have 
excellent correlation and agreement among civilian and military on the core 
competency set. 
 
There’s a total gap between military and civilian training and education efforts 
and if you simply lay side-by-side the military rank vs. the civilian rank and what 
training you’ll get, you will see a huge difference from even pre-commissioning 
through the 0-6 level as far as what training you’ll get.  For example, the majority 
of Colonels in the United States Army go to Senior Service College.  I would 
probably guess that the minority, there’s probably not much of an opportunity for 
your GS-14s, 15s in the civilian workforce, but anyway, if you just lay the two 
ranks side-by-side, you’ll see by yourself the difference in schooling between the 
two efforts.  As far as the leadership competencies, I do see a difference in change 
management as that understood and accepted by the civilians and that understood 
and accepted by the military.  The military is constantly taught, from the earliest 
days, to have a vision and then a strategy as to how to get to that vision.  And they 
are often taught how to deal with things that might go wrong, called breaches and 
sequels, and be prepared for those whereas most of the civilian leadership does 
not have the ability or the experience or education to consistently figure out where 
you’re going, what is the end-state, and then what is your method for getting to 
that end-state and breaking it up into ways and means.  For the last question, I 
would recommend keeping your technical competency programs exactly the way 
they are, but I would recommend several areas of instruction to the civilian 
acquisition workforce including history, including program management tools and 
techniques, team-building information, some other leadership development 
classes, detailed ‘multi-rater’ assessment program (not voluntary but 
comprehensive and that requires fellow IPT members, stakeholders, etc. provide 
feedback into a leader’s development effort).  And then I would recommend that 
the acquisition workforce take the metrics from those 360-degree assessments and 
build your leadership development program over what you see the shortfalls are.  
For example, you do 100 multi-rater assessments and 60 come back saying ‘this 
guy doesn’t know how to manage his time, run meetings, he’s confusing, and we 
don’t get any information. . . .’   Well then you need to go back to DAU, or 
somewhere else in the process, and do middle management, program information, 
team tools and techniques type blocks of instruction and incorporate that for the 




come back and say ‘this guy can’t get us all on the same sheet of music’, then go 
back and design a class that teaches him how to come up with a vision, how to  
come up with a method for obtaining that vision and put that back into your 
schooling system.  
 
Interviewer:  That addresses leaders in place today.  What about the long-term 
Army civilian leadership development 30 years from now?  You made the 
reference to (the need) for leadership development program so the inference is 
there really isn’t such a program for Army civilian leadership. 
 
Well there is, it’s just not as strong.  There are some areas where I think it’s 
weaker than it should be.  As for the future, 20-30 years down the road, I think the 
Joint Staff (the J-7) is doing a pretty good job of putting together, based upon the 
future Joint operating environment, those competencies you’ll need 20-30 years 
down the road including multicultural awareness, change management, and some 
other areas.  In my mind, the civilian workforce is just as much a Joint warfighter 
as someone wearing the uniform.  As a matter of fact, I’m a big proponent of a 
Joint service with a Joint civilian service as a part of that because you should have 
the competencies to work with Joint concepts, with the Navy, Marines or the 
Army, whether you’re a military or civilian.  So I would take emerging Joint 
competencies and use them and build civilian competencies and make sure the 
civilian workforce uses those because the Joint warfighter 20-30 years down the 
road includes, and should include, the military acquisition workforce civilian.  
 
Interviewer:  On that line and as an adjunct, is there a migration away from 
military acquisition positions and towards civilian?  There seems to be a reduction 
to, or at least a less emphatic approach towards, populating Army acquisition 
leadership positions with military personnel and supplanting them with civilian 
leaders.  Are you aware of such a migration or is that just perception? 
 
I would not be surprised.  I would probably anticipate that to be the reason, for 
that to be a true trend.  The Army has a program called Mil2Civ (military to 
civilian).  And that’s based upon the realization that we don’t have enough 
maneuver brigades in the Army to do all the missions we have to do.  And so 
there is a specific program from the Army to change as many military slots over to 
civilians and taking those military slots that have been freed up and putting them 
back into deployable-unit type of slots.  And that’s all because of the budget.  The 
budget constraints that the Army has forces us, since the only way we have to pay 
for more maneuver brigades, to take people out of some jobs they think they can 
civilianize.  And that’s how they raised the number of brigades and that’s how 






Functional Division Chief (Chief Engineer in Project Office), Retired Military 
 
 
Question 1:   
 
I don’t know of any documented differences in civilian leadership and Army 
leadership.  When you go to a leadership class in the civilian arena, they taught 
the same competencies as they do in the military leadership.  I do think there’s a 
difference in the two, but in a certain light I do think it matters.  I think the 
military leadership perception is that they get much more leadership training and 
the civilian leadership gets much more technical training.  So you have those two 
aspects of leadership; one being the technical, which is important and where I 
think the civilians shine, vs. the leadership of the tactical, which is where the 
military leadership has an advantage.  
 
Interviewer:  You talk to tactical vs. functional.  What do you think your military 
training provided you, as former active-duty and now a civilian that you would not 
have received if your education was only as a civilian? 
 
For me, the military leadership training early in my career, when I was 22-23 years 
old, the responsibility I had was much greater than a 22-year-old going into the 
civilian market as an engineer in the Government.  I was responsible for 30 men.  
Training them, all the day-to-day stuff that those guys did was my responsibility 
so I got thrust into much more of a leadership role than my civilian counterparts.  I 
think in the civilian counterpart, as a ‘functional’, you enter at the lowest rung so 
you’re the one being trained.  Where as a young military officer or leader, you’re 
the one responsible for training.  It’s almost a reversal of roles.  So I do think the 
military leaders, early in their career, get much more ‘leadership’ opportunities 
and the ability to get into situations where they develop their leadership style and 
their competencies much earlier than their civilian counterparts do.   
 
Interviewer:  I’d like to take that point and go straight to question #3. 
 
Personally, I think the level of training for the civilians is still very limited in 
comparison to the military counterparts.  And even the training we get for the 
Acquisition Corps is focused on the technical parts of being an acquisition officer 
so we learn about budgeting process; we learn about the contracting process, we 
learn about the test process.  We spend very little of our formal ‘education’ in the 
Acquisition Corps on leadership of people.  And so again, when we come out of 
an acquisition class, we’re technically competent but we’re not focused at all, in 
my mind, on the leadership aspects of our job as a division chief or as a lead 





Interviewer:  So is it safe to say that the Army’s civilian leadership programs, as 
you stated, leadership of people, and as compared to the military system, be 
considered sub par?  Does the civilian system need to improve dramatically?  
Greatly?  How close is it to being broken? 
 
From a formal training perspective, I think that civilian leadership training is not 
broken but it is very far from being adequate.  It’s inadequate.  And that’s been the 
role of the military as PMs and leaders to provide that leadership.  But as we 
transition to best-qualified PMs and product managers and best-qualified 
individuals, the civilian leaders are now being put in positions that have been 
traditionally military.  While we, I think, are head and shoulders above the 
military in a technical ‘how to do a contract’, from the pure management of 
people and handling people, we’re behind the power curve.  I don’t think it’s 
broken because over time the leaders rise to the top.  I think in the civilian world, 




Army Transformation has been defined in many, many ways.  So I do believe we 
should transform the way we do business in the Acquisition Corps because it 
takes so long to get something through the system.  There is a need to transform 
the way we do business.  But based on that, we have a lot of comfort in the way 
we do business today.  I understand what I have to do and in order to get a system 
into the field, what I have to do.  But the problem I see in transformation is there 
are certain people who want to transform the program offices.  The guys who are 
required to put products in the field want to transform by thinking outside the box.  
But other people don’t want to get out of the box.  They don’t mind getting out of 
the box for everyone else but in their area, but in their area, they still want you to 
fill out these forms, you still have to go through this review.  Transformation has 
to start at the top.  The top has to enable transformation and has to allow 
transformation to happen and be willing to accept the risk of something getting 
dropped as a result of transformation.  Nobody is going to do that in Aviation.  
We still qualify things today the same way we did 35 years ago.  There’s been no 
real innovation in testing or anything like that.  We still have to do X, Y, and Z to 
qualify a component.  So when you talk about Army Transformation, that’s a part 
of the challenge.  Yeah the PM is going to say ‘let’s go change the way we do 
business’ but the guys in the other arenas of acquisition aren’t willing to make that 
same decision.     
 
Interviewer:  Such as test? 
 





Question 3:   
 
Embedded in the above discussion. 
 
Question 4:   
 
That’s an interesting question.  I perceive the gap, if there is a gap, at the young 
acquisition civilian level and maybe even the mid-acquisition level.  I think the 
gap shrinks when you get to the senior acquisition level.  And the reason I think 
that is over time, the civilian leaders learn leadership and leadership techniques.  I 
think initially there is a large gap but I think that the military leaders are taught to 
lead and the civilian leaders are taught to be competent in their chosen field, 
whether that be engineering, technical, programmatics, business, whatever.  So I 
think that over time, they balance each other out.  What I don’t see though is 
where the civilian side selects and nurtures and mentors the best civilian leaders 
and provides them with their leadership opportunities.  I think the civilian leaders 
get good leadership but it’s based on their individual management of themselves.  
But I do believe that there is a gap that is narrowed down somewhat.  Personally I 
believe that at the senior acquisition level, the leadership competencies have to be 
the same.  I’m not saying that they are the same today, but I do believe they need 
to be the same.  I think that civilian leaders have to be leaders and understand 
leadership as much as they understand the technical part of the job.  And so that’s 
where I think we need to focus the training of the civilian core is in pure 
leadership.  There’s enough technical areas where they get good training but not 
where it helps them in a leadership area.  They learn leadership through 
experience versus getting leadership opportunities in a planned way. 
 
Interviewer:  You talk about a ‘planned way’.  These interviews have brought out 
the fact that the military has a ‘draw’ function and there is no forcing function for 
the civilians.  There is no concerted effort to ‘import’ civilians into a leadership 
development program.  Is that a shortcoming of the Army?  What thoughts do you 
have? 
 
I do think that it is a shortcoming.  And again it’s a challenge because I think that 
the Army Acquisition Corps needs to do a better job of identifying good civilian 
leaders and nurturing that out.  We’re so concerned with a competition that 
nobody gets left out that sometimes we put somebody in that is not a good leader 
but they have all the technical skills that a given job requires.  And so therefore 
you put someone in there and then they are in that position.  The other thing that I 
have an issue with is there is no ‘up-or-out’ mentality.  A civilian leader can get 
into a position and basically stay there for 15 years.  That does two things.  It 
stifles his growth and it stifles the growth of the people under that person.  So 




from that of the military.  But as the military side goes down, we’ve got to put 
more emphasis on the civilian workforce to take over that leadership role.  The 
one issue I have, there is no leadership model for civilians.  There are technical 
models to get me to a Level III certification in engineering or systems acquisition, 
but nothing in leadership.  Now having said that, I don’t think it should be open to 
the masses either.  I think that it should be nominations through the senior 
leadership to identify those leaders and have some quality programs that can reach 
out and get more people and more leadership out of the civilians.   
 
Interviewer:  That helps gets you the ‘draw’ function mentioned earlier. 
 
Yes.  Too many times I see people that use, supervisors and employees alike, use 
education and training to get somebody out of the office or for me, to get myself 
out of the office.  We’re training the wrong people.  I would also say that I think 
that certain levels, at the highest level civilian acquisition positions like a Division 
Chief let’s say, shouldn’t be open competition to everyone at that grade level.  I 
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